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Two Essays on 
Information Ambiguity and Informed Traders’ Trade-Size Choice 
 
Ziwei Xu 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Defining ambiguity as investor’s uncertainty about the precision of the 
observed information, Chapter One constructs an empirical measure of ambiguity 
based on analysts’ earnings forecast information, and finds that the market tends 
to react more negatively to highly ambiguous bad news, while it tends to be less 
responsive to highly ambiguous good news. This result supports the theoretical 
argument of Epstein and Schneider (2003, 2008) that ambiguity-averse investors 
take a worst-case assessment of the information precision, when they are 
uncertain about the information precision. In addition, Chapter One shows that 
returns on stocks exposed to highly ambiguous and intangible information are 
more negatively skewed. 
 Chapter Two finds that certain traders are informed about either the 
forthcoming analysts’ forecasts or long-term value of the stock, and informed 
traders prefer to use medium-size trades to exploit their private information 
advantage. Specifically, medium-size trade imbalance prior to the forecast 
announcements is positively correlated with the nature of forecast revisions, 
while in the days immediately after the forecasts medium-size trade imbalance is 
positively correlated with future stock returns for up to four months. Small-size 
trade imbalance is also positively correlated with future returns but only following 
downward revisions. In contrast, it is also shown that large trades placed right 
after the forecasts are unprofitable and generate slightly negative profits in the 
long run. Overall, our results are consistent with the “stealth trading hypothesis” 
proposed by Barclay and Warner (1993). 
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Chapter 1 
Market Response to Ambiguous Good and Bad News 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper examines whether in the presence of information ambiguity 
investors react differently to firm-specific good and bad news. Following Epstein 
and Schneider (2008), this study defines information ambiguity as investor’s 
uncertainty about the precision of observed information. Mathematically, suppose 
that investors want to estimate a parameter θ  , and what they can observe is a 
signal s , which equals to: 



∈+=
2222 ,),,0(~, sssss σσσσεεθ                                              (1) 
Here, ε  is the noise in the signal s , and information precision (IP) is measured 
by the inverse of the standard deviation of the noises 2/1 sσ , whereas information 
ambiguity (IA) is captured by the range of possible information precisions 
]/1,/1[
22
ss σσ . 
Prior studies have found that the market tends to be more responsive to 
news with high levels of IP. In particular, several empirical studies focusing on 
analysts’ forecasts have shown that the magnitude of investors’ responses to 
forecast revisions increases with the expected accuracy of the forecasts (see 
Stickel (1992), Park and Stice (2000), and Clement and Tse (2003)). On the 
other hand, Epstein and Schneider (2003, 2008) have shown, theoretically, that 
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IA also matters in terms of the market response to news. Inspired by the 
experimental evidence that is typified by the Ellsberg Paradox, they argue that an 
ambiguity-averse agent behaves as if he maximizes expected utility under a 
worst-case scenario. Since when observing a bad (good) signal with uncertainty 
about its precision, the worst-case scenario is that the signal is precise 
(imprecise), agents are expected to take ambiguous bad news seriously and 
ignore ambiguous good news. As a result, upon the arrival of ambiguous 
information, the market is expected to react more strongly to bad news than to 
good news. 
To date, there is little empirical evidence documenting the effect of IA on 
market reactions to firm-specific news and whether the reactions to good and 
bad news are asymmetric as suggested by the theory. One of the challenging 
obstacles to testing IA effects on market reaction to corporate news is to 
empirically measure the level of IA. This study fills the gap in the literature and is 
the first to provide a measure of IA and show evidence in support of the 
theoretical arguments of Epstain and Schneider (2003, 2008). Similar to prior 
studies, this paper focuses on analysts’ earnings forecasts as the source of firm-
specific news. There are several advantages of doing so. First, analyst forecasts 
are ambiguous information. Unlike actual earnings which are required to be 
accurate by law, the market is usually not sure about the precision of earnings 
forecasts. Second, the forecasts are quantitative information, which enables us to 
quantitatively measure IA. While using other ambiguous information sources, 
such as the news from the press that offer qualitative assessments of the firms, 
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make it not only hard to determine the ambiguity level of these news but also 
difficult to classify them into good and bad news, analyst forecast revisions can 
be readily sorted into good- or bad- news groups based on their signs. 
This paper constructs a measure of IA that is specific to each analyst 
forecast and based on the forecast history of the analyst following a particular 
firm. To measure IA in a manner that is consistent with our definition, we first 
estimate a model that predicts the IP (measured by the historical absolute 
forecast errors) of each forecast. If investors observe that it is hard to predict the 
IP of a certain analyst’s forecast based on the historical accuracy and other ex 
ante information, then by definition, they should perceive the forecast by this 
analyst as highly ambiguous information. Therefore, we measure IA for each 
analyst-firm pair as the amount of historical variations in the portion of actual IPs 
of this analyst-firm pair that is left unexplained by a predictive model of IP, i.e., 
the variations in the unpredictable portion of the actual IPs.  
Based on the tests utilizing the above mentioned IA measure, this paper 
finds evidence largely supporting the theoretical predictions of Epstein and 
Schneider (2003, 2008). In particular, we find that, among downward forecast 
revisions (i.e. bad news), highly ambiguous forecasts are associated with more 
negative market responses during the forecast announcement period. Meanwhile, 
among upward forecast revisions that are also higher than the historical trend (i.e. 
good news), highly ambiguous forecasts are associated with a less positive 
market response. Overall, the results suggest that the market is taking 
ambiguous bad news more seriously than ambiguous good news. Consistent 
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with prior studies (Stickel (1992), Park and Stice (2000), and Clement and Tse 
(2003)) that focus on the effect of IP, we also find that the market chooses to 
ignore the forecasts with high expected forecast errors, regardless of whether the 
news is good or bad. 
A corollary of the asymmetric response to highly ambiguous good and bad 
news found above, is that stocks with high level of IA should be associated with 
more negatively skewed stock returns. Therefore, we further test if the IA 
measure aggregated at firm-level can explain cross-sectional variations in stock 
return skewness. This test also serves the purpose of validating whether the IA 
measure estimated based on analysts’ forecast information can be used as a 
general proxy for the average ambiguity level of various types of information 
about a firm during a certain time period. Epstein and Schneider (2008) argue 
that the arrival of tangible signals tend to “correct” the prior reactions to intangible 
signals, which is assumed to be ambiguous information. It follows that the 
skewness of stocks’ returns during a certain period should also be influenced by 
the relative arrival rates of tangible and intangible information about the firm 
during that period. Firms exposed to highly ambiguous information coupled with 
high relative arrival frequency of intangible information are expected to have 
more negatively skewed returns. We use the proportion of intangible assets (plus 
good-wills) as a proxy for the relative arrival rates of tangible and intangible 
information for the firm. Consistent with the theory, we find that stocks with high 
level of IA and intangible assets have more negatively skewed returns. 
 5 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this paper 
constructs a novel measure of IA and, to our knowledge, is the first to provide 
empirical support for the theory of Epstein and Schneider (2003, 2008). Second, 
this paper adds a new dimension in explaining market response to analyst 
forecasts. Prior studies (see Park and Stice (2000), Clement and Tse (2003), 
among others) focus on the effect of expected forecast errors (or expected IP), 
while our study suggests that the market response is also influenced by expected 
IA. Third, this study also contributes to the existing literature that documents an 
asymmetric market response to the firm-specific good and bad news. Xu (2007) 
studies market reaction to actual earnings announcements and finds that stock 
prices display a stronger reaction to positive than to negative earnings surprises 
of equal magnitudes, which induces, on average, a positive market response 
during the earnings announcement period. He suggests that the asymmetric 
market response is due to short sale constraints suppressing pessimistic 
investors from expressing their views. Our findings also show that the average 
market response during the analyst forecast announcement period is positive, 
but becomes less positive when the forecasts are more ambiguous. Finally, we 
find that, in addition to the factors suggested by Xu (2007), IA is an important 
determinant of stock return skewness.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we 
introduce our IA measure. Section III contains the performance of the model 
predicting the forecast errors and our main results on how market response to 
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news with differing level of IA. In Section IV, we present the results of the IA 
effect on stock return skewness. Section V concludes the paper.  
 
 1.2 Existing Literature and Hypotheses 
 A large body of literature studying analyst earnings forecasts has shown 
that the magnitude of market reaction to forecast announcement increases with 
the expected accuracy (IP) of the forecasts or analyst characteristics that is 
positively related to forecast accuracy. For example, Stickel (1992) finds that All 
American Analysts selected by Institutional Investors supply more accurate 
forecasts than other analysts, and their forecast announcements have greater 
price impact, especially following large upward forecast revisions. Similarly, Park 
and Stice (2000) show that for analysts with superior tracking record, i.e., a 
history of providing accurate forecasts, their forecast revisions are associated 
with stronger market reaction. Finally, Clement and Tse (2003) construct a 
predictive model for forecast accuracy based on various analyst and forecast 
characteristics, and find that the price response coefficient increases with the 
predicted accuracy estimated from the model. It is also shown that although all of 
the characteristics in the model are correlated with future forecast accuracy 
investors are only responsive to a subset of the characteristics, suggesting that 
investors fail to extract all the information that has predictive power for forecast 
accuracy. 
 On the other hand, little is known on how the market responds to forecasts 
whose accuracy is unknown, i.e., highly ambiguous (high-IA) forecasts. 
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Theoretically, Epstein and Schneider (2003, 2008) argue that an ambiguity-
averse agent behaves as if he maximizes expected utility under a worst-case 
scenario, which is consistent with the experimental evidence typified by Ellsberg 
Paradox1. Since when observing a bad (good) signal with uncertainty about its 
precision, the worst-case scenario is that the signal is precise (imprecise), agents 
are expected to take ambiguous bad news seriously and ignore ambiguous good 
news. Applying this prediction to analysts’ forecasts, it follows that: 
Hypothesis (1): Among the high-IA forecasts, the market reacts more 
strongly to downward revisions than to upward revisions.  
Empirically, a more general test is to examine how market reactions vary 
across forecasts with different levels of IA. This study predicts that this relation 
depends on the nature of the news. In particular, among bad-news (downward-
revision) forecasts, the market responds more negatively to high-IA forecasts 
than to low-IA forecasts, whereas among good-news (upward-revision) forecasts, 
the market responds less positively to high-IA forecasts than to low-IA forecasts. 
This prediction can be inferred from prior findings of an IP effect on forecast 
announcement and Hypothesis (1) above. To illustrate this, here is a numerical 
example (see Figure 2). Assume that there are two types of forecast revisions: 
low-precision revisions (LPRs) and high-precision revisions (HPRs). The arrival 
rate of each type of revisions is 50%. Based on prior studies’ findings that the 
market responds more strongly to news of higher expected accuracy, we can 
also assume that the market reaction is -1% for the downward HPRs, 1% for 
                                                 
1
 See Ellsberg (1961) for details. 
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upward HPRs, and 0% for LPRs revisions regardless of the direction of the 
revision. Since the investors can almost always tell which forecasts are LPRs or 
HPRs it follows that if they are low-IA forecasts, the average reaction to this 
group should be close to -0.5% for downward revisions and 0.5% for upward 
revisions. On the other hand, in the case of high-IA forecasts, it is impossible for 
investors to differentiate HPRs from LPRs. If the investors are ambiguity-averse, 
they will act assuming the worst-case assessment about the precision, i.e., treat 
all the downward (upward) revisions as HPRs (LPRs). Consequently, the 
average reaction to high-IA downward forecasts should be close to -1%, while 
the average reaction to high-IA upward forecasts should be close to 0%. These 
predictions can be summarized in the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis (2): Among downward-revision forecasts, on average, the 
market response more negatively to high-IA forecasts than to low-IA forecasts, 
whereas among upward-revision forecasts, on average, the market response 
less positively to high-IA forecasts than to low-IA forecasts. 
 
Figure 1.1 Numerical Example 
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 Following Hypothesis (1), it is expected that stocks that are exposed to 
high-IA news should have more negatively skewed returns. In addition, Epstein 
and Schneider (2008) argue that the stock return skewness for a firm measured 
during certain time period is not only determined by the average level of IA for 
the news announced during the period, but also by the arrival frequency of the 
ambiguous news relative to the unambiguous news. They show that the arrival of 
tangible signals (e.g., dividend or earnings announcements), which are assumed 
to be unambiguous information, tend to “correct” the prior market reactions to 
intangible signals (e.g., the press articles speculating the firm’s prospects), which 
are assumed to be ambiguous information. So a firm should have more 
negatively skewed returns during certain period, only if it is exposed to signals 
with high level of IA and relatively more ambiguous signals. The third hypothesis 
is summarized as following: 
 Hypothesis (3): Firms exposed to signals with high level of IA and 
relatively more ambiguous signals are expected to have more negatively skewed 
returns. 
 
1.3 The Information Ambiguity Measure 
To get a measure of IA that is consistent with our definition of IA as the 
range of possible values of IP, we first need to estimate a model that predicts the 
IP of each analyst’s forecast. One widely used ex post measure of analyst 
forecast IP is the absolute forecast error (FCST_ERR). There is a large body of 
studies that find associations between FCST_ERR and several ex ante forecast 
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and analyst characteristics: forecast timeliness, analyst experience, broker size, 
and so on (see Mikhail, et al. (1997); Clement (1999); Jacob, et al. (1999) among 
others). This study incorporates all these formerly identified variables to a 
prediction model for FCST_ERR. By definition, when the forecast information is 
highly ambiguous, it should be difficult to get an accurate estimate of the 
expected information precision, i.e., it is expected that for high-IA analyst 
forecasts, their predicted IPs should be less accurate than those of low-IA 
forecasts. Therefore, we can measure IA as the amount of variation in the portion 
of actual IP left unexplained by the model. In particular, our IA measure for the 
forecast of certain analyst following certain firm equals to the standard deviation 
of the historical residuals from the prediction model of the same analyst following 
the same firm. 
The intuition behind the IA measure can be illustrated using a numerical 
example. Suppose that analyst A1 following firm F1 has a track record of (scaled) 
FCST_ERRs of 10%, 10%, 10%, 10% and 10% over the past 5 years, while 
analyst A2 following firm F2 has a track record of FCST_ERRs of 10%, 10%, 0%, 
0%, and 10% during the same period. Investors following these analysts should 
feel quite confident that the FCST_ERR for the forecast issued by analyst A1 this 
year will still be around 10%. On the other hand, for analyst A2, the expected 
probability of her issuing a very accurate forecast (FCST_ERR=0%) is similar to 
the probability of her issuing an inaccurate forecast (FCST_ERR=10%). So the 
uncertainty about Analyst A2’s forecast accuracy (i.e., the information ambiguity, 
IA) should be much higher than that of Analyst A1. Furthermore, simply using the 
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standard deviation of the historical FCST_ERRs is problematic. Since certain 
forecast and analyst characteristics can change over time, part of the changes in 
the FCST_ERRs should be predictable. For example, if an analyst this year 
makes a forecast later in the fiscal year period, i.e., closer to the actual earnings 
announcement date, than he did last year, investors should expect this year’s 
forecast to be more accurate. Thus, we calculate IAs as the standard deviations 
of the residuals from a prediction model for the FCST_ERR that accounts for all 
the potential changes in various relevant characteristics2.  
Specifically, in a given year t, we run the following pooled OLS regression 
across all analyst-firm pairs for the past n years (from year t-n to year t-1). 
ijtjttjijtijt
tititij
tijijtijt
ijtijttijijt
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This model is an augmented version of the Clement and Tse (2003) model 
with additional controls for firm characteristics. We predict that the absolute 
forecast error for analyst i following firm j during year t (FCST_ERRijt) should 
increase with prior absolute forecast error (FCST_ERRij(t-1)) and  forecast horizon 
(FCST_HRZN). Mikhail, et al. (1997) and Jacob, et al. (1999) find that 
FCST_ERR decreases as analysts gain more firm-specific experience 
(EXPRNCE). Clement (1999) and Jacob, et al. (1999) find that analysts from 
brokerage firms that employ many analysts (BROKER_SIZE) issue forecasts 
                                                 
2
 We do not use the average of historical residuals, because rational investors will adjust their 
forecast by the mean of historical residuals, if the residuals are always maintained at certain level. 
E.g., if the residuals from the model are always 10% for analyst A1 in the past 5 years, investors 
should realize that this model always underestimates the FCST_ERR by 10% for analyst A1. So 
they should feel confident that the FCST_ERR of analyst A1 this year should be somewhere near 
the predicted value of FCST_ERR from the model plus 10%. 
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with less FCST_ERRs. Jacob, et al. (1999) document that FCST_ERR 
decreases with the analysts’ forecast frequency during each fiscal year 
(FCST_FREQ), which is considered to be a proxy of the amount of effort that the 
analysts apply in analyzing the firm. Jacob, et al. (1999) and Clement (1999) also 
find that FCST_ERR tends to increase with the, number of companies and 
industries followed by the analyst (COMP_NUM, IND_NUM), since additional 
forecasting tasks may reduce the amount of research effort the analyst allocates 
to each firm being followed. It is also expected that the FCST_ERR is high when 
the analysts are more likely to be herding (see, for example, DeBond and Forbes 
(1999)).1F3 The herding dummy here equals to one when the forecast is not the 
first one among all the analysts following the firm during the fiscal year, and it 
equals to zero otherwise. It is unlikely for the first forecasters to herd, because no 
other forecasts have been made for the current fiscal year. We also expect the 
FCST_ERR to decrease with days elapsed from the most recent forecast 
(DAYS_ELPS), since there may be more firm-specific information made available 
to the analysts during the period. The model also controls for other firm 
characteristics. We predict that the FCST_ERR is higher when the firm is small, 
has more business segments, and has more volatile earnings. The market-to-
book ratio, as a proxy for firm’s growth opportunities, is also included, although 
the predicted coefficient sign of this variable is unclear given existing theories. 
The detailed definitions of all variables are shown in Table I, Panel A. 
                                                 
3
 Herding is not directly observable, Therefore, studies like Olsen (1996), DeBondt and Forbes 
(1999) and Kim and Pantzalis (2003) operationalized the definition of herding among security 
analysts as excessive agreement among analysts that produce estimates with large errors. 
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Table 1.1 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Variables  Definition 
Panel A: Variables for the Absolute Forecast Error Model [Model (1)] 
Absolute Forecast Error FCST_ERRijt It is the absolute value of the difference between the 
forecasted EPS value by analyst i following firm j in 
year t and the actual EPS value for the corresponding 
fiscal year, scaled by the stock closing price two days 
prior to the analyst’s forecast announcement.  
Days Elapsed DAYS_ELPSijt It is the number of days between the current forecast 
by analyst i following firm j in year t and the most 
recent forecast made by any analyst following firm j 
during the same fiscal year, and it equals to 0 if the 
current forecast is the first one during the 
corresponding fiscal year. 
Herding Dummy HERD_DUMijt It equals to 0, if the forecast by analyst i is the first 
one among all the forecasts by the analysts following 
firm j during the same fiscal year, and it equals to 1 
otherwise. 
Analyst Experience EXPRNCEijt It is the number of years during which analyst i has 
issued at least one forecast for firm j, as documented 
by I/B/E/S. 
Forecast Horizon FCST_HRZNijt It is the number of days from the current forecast by 
analyst i following firm j in year t to the corresponding 
fiscal-year end. 
Forecast Frequency FCST_FREQijt It is the number of forecasts made by analyst i for firm 
j during the year t. 
Broker Size BROKER_SIZEijt It is the number of analysts in year t that are 
employed by the broker hiring analyst i, as 
documented by I/B/E/S. 
Number of Companies  COMP_NUMit It is the number of companies followed by analyst i in 
year t. 
Number of Industries IND_NUMit It is the number of two-digit SIC industries followed by 
analyst i in year t. 
Firm Size SIZEijt It is the market capitalization of firm j two-days prior to 
analyst i's forecast in year t, scaled by the producer 
price index of finished goods in the corresponding 
year-month. 
Market-to-book Ratio M/Bijt It is the ratio of the market capitalization of firm j two-
days prior to analyst i's forecast in year t to the book 
value of common equity at the end of the fiscal year 
ending in year t-1. 
Earnings Volatility VAR_EPSjt It is the sample variance of the annual EPS growth 
rates of firm j over the past 5 fiscal years. EPS growth 
rate is calculated as the current EPS less prior-year 
EPS scaled by the absolute value of prior-year EPS. 
Here, EPS is the calculated as the operating income 
before depreciation divided by the number of common 
shares outstanding at the fiscal-year end. 
Number of Business 
Segments  
BUSSEG_NUMjt It is the number of business segments that the firm j 
has during the fiscal year ending in year t. 
Panel B: Variables for the Market Response Model 
Cummulative Abnormal 
Return 
CAR3ijt It is the three-trading-day cumulative market-adjusted 
return surrounding analyst i's forecast for firm j in year 
t. The measurement period starts one trading before 
the forecast and ends one trading day after the 
forecast. The market adjusted return is calculated by 
subtracting the concurrent value-weighted market 
return from the firm j’s daily stock return. 
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Information Ambiguity 
(based on n-year history) 
IAn ijt To calculate IAn, we first run the pooled OLS 
regression based on Model (1) from year t-n to year t-
1, and then IAn is calculated as the sample standard 
deviation of the regression residuals of analyst i 
following firm j from year t-n to year t-1. 
Predicted Absolute Forecast 
Error 
(based on n-year history) 
PRED_lnERRnijt To calculate PRED_lnERRn, we first run the pooled 
OLS regression based on Model (1) from year t-n to 
year t-1, and then PRED_lnERRn is calculated as the 
predicted value of the log of absolute forecast error 
for analyst i following firm j in year t, based on the 
coefficients estimated from the prior regression. 
Forecast Revision FCST_REVijt It is the forecasted EPS value by analyst i following 
firm j in year t, less the actual EPS from the last fiscal 
year, scaled by the stock closing price two days prior 
to the analyst’s forecast announcement. 
Adjusted Forecast Revision FCST_REV2ijt It is the forecast revision by analyst i following firm j in 
year t, less the historical average of forecast revisions 
by analyst i following firm j during the period from year 
t-3 to year t-1. 
Panel C: Variables for the Stock Skewness Model 
Stock Skewness SKEWjt It is the third-order standardized moment of daily log 
returns for firm j in year t. Log return is the logarithm 
of one plus the daily return. 
Average IA AVG_IA5jt It is the average of IA5s estimated for all the analysts 
following firm j in year t. IA5 here is estimated using 
the rolling window from year t-4 to year t. 
Intangible Assets INTANGjt It is the firm j’s total intangible assets (reported on the 
balance sheet) plus the goodwill scaled by total 
assets at the end of current fiscal year. 
Stock Volatility VOL_RETjt It is the sample standard deviation of the daily log 
returns for firm j in year t. Log return is the logarithm 
of one plus the daily return. 
Detrended Turnover DETRN_TOjt It is the average of daily turnovers for firm j in year t, 
and the daily turnover is detrended by a moving 
average of past 20-trading-day turnover. Daily 
turnover is calculated as the ratio of daily share 
volume to total shares outstanding. This measure is 
calculated for NYSE and AMEX stocks only. 
Average Size AVG_SIZEjt It is the average of daily market capitalizations of firm j 
in year t. 
Annual Return ARETjt It is the cumulative stock return for firm j in year t. 
Institutional Ownership INS_OWNjt It is the average of the quarterly institutional 
ownerships of firm j in year t, which are the ratios of 
shares held by 13(f) financial institutions to shares 
outstanding at the end of the quarter. 
Ownership Breadth OWN_BRDjt It is the average of the quarterly ownership breadths 
of firm j in year t, which are the ratios of number of 
13(f) financial institutions holding the firm j’s shares to 
total number of 13(f) institutions presenting in 
Thomason Reuters 13(f) institutional holding data at 
the end of the quarter. 
 
IA is measured by the sample standard deviation of the FCST_ERR 
residuals of analyst i following firm j from Model (1) over the past n years (from 
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year t-n to year t-1). Since the IA measure is limited to use the information only 
up to year t-1, it is insured that the measure is ex ante and can be considered as 
a proxy for the investors’ expectation of IA. 
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The length of the rolling estimation window (n) is reduced to 5 years for some 
later empirical tests2F4. Realizing that this choice is quite ad hoc, we also try 7-
year and 9-year rolling windows to estimate IA as robustness checks.                                                              
 
1.4 The Ambiguity Effect on Market Reactions to Analyst Forecasts 
1.4.1  Data and Sample Selection 
 Analysts’ forecast information is obtained from the Institutional Broker 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Detailed History database 5 . The forecasts are for 
firms’ current fiscal year-end earnings. The initial sample for estimating the model 
predicting forecast errors (Equation (2)) starts from January 1983 and ends in 
December 20074F6. The sample period for testing the market reaction to analyst 
forecast announcement starts from January 1994 to December 2007. Clement 
and Tse (2003) suggest that prior to the early 1990s, the forecast release date 
recorded in I/B/E/S often differs from the actual forecast date by a few days, but 
                                                 
4
 It is not required that the analyst must have a 5-year full history of following the firm. Obviously, 
the IA tends to be higher for analysts with short forecasting history, for which we have fewer 
observations used to calculate sample standard deviation. This feature is actually desirable, since 
the investors should be more uncertain about the analyst’s forecast precision, if they can only 
observe a short track record for the analyst. 
5 The rounding error problem associated with I/B/E/S adjusted data (Barber and Kang (2002)) is 
less severe in the case of the detailed history I/B/E/S database, where the estimates are rounded 
to four decimals, instead of two decimals as is the case in the summary history I/B/E/S database. 
6
 The data coverage of I/B/E/S for the U.S. firms is poor prior to 1983 (see Diether et al. (2002)). 
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the accuracy of the forecast release date is improved after 1994. Since the event 
study always requires accurate event dates, this paper also estimates IA and 
conducts the rest of tests starting from 1994. Stock prices and returns data are 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and firms’ 
accounting data are from Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual Files. 
We require that forecasts must be made at least 30 days, but no more 
than 1 year, before the fiscal-year end. Certain observations are also eliminated, 
if any of the following conditions are met. (1) No valid stock price and accounting 
information is available from CRSP and Compustat to construct the variables 
listed in Table 1. (2) The stocks are not ordinary common stocks, i.e., the share 
code does not equal to 10, 11, or 12. (3) The analyst did not issue a forecast in 
the prior fiscal year for the firm. This condition is needed, because the prediction 
model for forecast accuracy requires the prior fiscal-year forecast information. (4) 
The forecasts are made prior to the announcement of last fiscal year’s actual 
earnings. This requirement is needed to ensure that the forecast revision 
measure uses ex ante information, since the forecast revision is to compare the 
current forecasts with the last fiscal-year actual earnings, which has to be 
available before the current forecasts. The sample is restricted to the first 
forecast for each analyst-firm pair during the forecast period that also satisfies 
the above requirements. The first forecasts, which have long forecast horizons, 
tend to be the most inaccurate ones and, thus, uncertainty about the accuracy of 
these forecasts should also be high. Consequently, using this sample is expected 
to generate ample cross-sectional variations in information ambiguity. Effectively, 
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there is only one observation for each analyst-firm pair per fiscal year. After 
imposing these constraints, we obtain a final sample that contains an average of 
1860 firms and 12725 analyst-firm pairs every year during the period of 1994-
2007. 
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper are presented 
in Table 1.2. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile, 
and are at annual frequency. Panel A covers the variables used in the model that 
predicts analyst forecast errors (Equation (2)). Panel B reports the variables in 
the model that explains the market response to analyst forecasts (Equation (4)). 
Variables in Panel A and B are at the forecast level or the analyst-firm level. 
Panel C reports the variables in the model that explains stock return skewness 
(Equation (5)). The variables in Panel C are aggregated at the firm level. Panel D 
and E report Pearson correlations among our main variables and the 
corresponding P-values in parentheses. As shown in Panel D, the IA measure is 
positively correlated with the expected IP (PRED_lnERR5), which is as expected, 
since the investors’ uncertainty regarding IP should be high when the expected 
IP is low (or PRED_lnERR5 is high). On the other hand, the correlation of these 
two variables is not too high, about 6%, suggesting that the IA measure still 
contains some unique information that is not captured by PRED_lnERR5. After 
aggregating the IA measure at the firm level in Panel E, we can see that firms 
with high levels of IA tend to be smaller and their stocks perform poorly in the 
current year. Meanwhile, Panel E also shows that high-IA stocks have more 
volatile earnings, less institutional ownership, and lower level of ownership 
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breadth. Although the negative sign of the correlation between IA and the 
proportion of intangible assets (INTANG) is somewhat not expected, the 
magnitude is very small, around -1.58%. 
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Table 1.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Here we report the summary statistics of the main variables across all firms and years. All the 
variables are at the annual frequency. All the variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one 
percentile. 
 
Panel A: Variables for the Absolute Forecast Error Model [Model (1)] 
(Analyst-Firm level, 1983-2007) 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
1
st
 
percentile 
25
th
 
percentile 
Median 
75
th
 
percentile 
99
th
 
percentile 
FCST_ERR 264928 0.0193 0.0453 0.0000 0.0013 0.0048 0.0159 0.3271 
DAYS_ELPS 264928 6.0825 11.9166 0 0 1 7 69 
HERD_DUM 264928 0.5624 0.4961 0 0 1 1 1 
EXPRNCE 264928 3.4477 2.8130 1 1 3 5 14 
FCST_HRZN 264928 271.4521 68.5134 56 243 293 324 348 
FCST_FREQ 264928 3.5741 2.0200 1 2 3 5 10 
BROKER_SIZE 264928 55.5711 54.6535 1 18 41 66 276 
COMP_NUM 264928 18.5507 13.3723 2 11 15 21 80 
IND_NUM 264928 4.9693 3.4113 1 3 4 6 18 
SIZE 264928 9.6007 1.6802 5.7257 8.4556 9.6096 10.7380 13.6260 
M/B 264928 3.4087 3.4492 -2.2366 1.5318 2.3756 3.9628 21.9895 
VAR_EPS 264928 19.2161 134.8504 0.0017 0.0426 0.0937 0.3220 1250.3321 
BUSSEG_NUM 264928 2.3724 1.6723 1 1 2 3 8 
Panel B: Variables for the Market Response Model 
(Analyst-Firm level, 1994-2007) 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
1
st
 
percentile 
25
th
 
percentile 
Median 
75
th
 
percentile 
99
th
 
percentile 
CAR3 (%) 83139 0.1157 5.6564 -19.1273 -2.4856 -0.0044 2.6891 18.3414 
IA5 83139 1.1150 0.6680 0.0420 0.6413 1.0107 1.4670 3.4136 
IA7 83139 1.1268 0.6503 0.0453 0.6764 1.0370 1.4630 3.3875 
IA9 83139 1.1352 0.6465 0.0459 0.6934 1.0498 1.4648 3.3978 
PRED_lnERR5 83139 -5.3974 1.0844 -8.0868 -6.1139 -5.3585 -4.6333 -2.9965 
PRED_lnERR7 83139 -5.3990 1.1035 -8.1380 -6.1272 -5.3591 -4.6223 -2.9602 
PRED_lnERR9 83139 -5.4056 1.1230 -8.1945 -6.1480 -5.3674 -4.6146 -2.9286 
FCST_REV 83139 0.0098 0.0334 -0.0764 0.0014 0.0048 0.0106 0.1940 
FCST_REV2 82684 0.0002 0.0356 -0.1558 -0.0044 0.0004 0.0048 0.1611 
Panel C: Variables for the Stock Skewness Model 
(Firm level, 1994-2007) 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
1
st
 
percentile 
25
th
 
percentile 
Median 
75
th
 
percentile 
99
th
 
percentile 
SKEW 20765 -0.0706 1.1091 -5.0058 -0.3079 0.0861 0.4310 2.8475 
AVG_IA5 20765 1.1571 0.5600 0.1423 0.7794 1.0743 1.4387 3.1429 
INTANG 20765 0.2059 0.2752 0.0000 0.0000 0.0812 0.3149 1.1724 
VOL_RET 20765 0.0279 0.0136 0.0090 0.0181 0.0247 0.0343 0.0766 
DETRN_TO 12360 0.0193 0.1289 -0.4192 -0.0289 0.0089 0.0579 0.5664 
AVG_SIZE 20765 13.7694 1.6691 10.2659 12.5897 13.6695 14.8547 18.1225 
ARET (%) 20765 15.27029 50.68505 -76.3308 -15.3091 8.465608 35.66045 233.8171 
INS_OWN (%) 20763 62.06885 23.47481 8.35933 45.4448 64.16467 79.74758 111.1199 
OWN_BRD (%) 20763 9.349544 9.400359 0.597627 3.641387 6.434627 11.40103 54.24653 
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Panel D: Pearson Correlations (P-values) of Variables for the Market Response Model 
(Analyst-Firm level, 1994-2007) 
 IA5 IA7 IA9 
PRED_ 
lnERR5 
PRED_ 
lnERR7 
PRED_ 
lnERR9 
FCST_ 
REV 
FCST_ 
REV2 
CAR3 
-0.01118 
(0.0013) 
-0.01107 
(0.0014) 
-0.01154 
(0.0009) 
0.00016 
(0.9643) 
-0.00007 
(0.9831) 
-0.00056 
(0.8708) 
0.04071 
(<.0001) 
0.04828 
(<.0001) 
IA5  
0.96841 
(<.0001) 
0.95624 
(<.0001) 
0.06149 
(<.0001) 
0.06099 
(<.0001) 
0.06026 
(<.0001) 
0.03416 
(<.0001) 
-0.00896 
(0.0099) 
IA7   
0.98822 
(<.0001) 
0.06838 
(<.0001) 
0.06789 
(<.0001) 
0.06728 
(<.0001) 
0.03631 
(<.0001) 
-0.00951 
(0.0063) 
IA9    
0.06974 
(<.0001) 
0.06928 
(<.0001) 
0.06875 
(<.0001) 
0.03713 
(<.0001) 
-0.00962 
(0.0057) 
PRED_lnERR5     
0.99880 
(<.0001) 
0.99773 
(<.0001) 
0.25479 
(<.0001) 
0.04339 
(<.0001) 
PRED_lnERR7      
0.99929 
(<.0001) 
0.25461 
(<.0001) 
0.04258 
(<.0001) 
PRED_lnERR9       
0.25443 
(<.0001) 
0.04229 
(<.0001) 
FCST_REV        
0.69831 
(<.0001) 
 
 
Panel E: Pearson Correlations (P-values) of Variables for the Stock Skewness Model 
(Firm level, 1994-2007) 
 AVG_IA5 INTANG VOL_RET AVG_SIZE ARET 
Ln(INS_ 
OWN) 
Ln(OWN_ 
BRD) 
DETRND_
TO 
SKEW -0.03766 
(<.0001) 
-0.05396 
(<.0001) 
-0.13254 
(<.0001) 
-0.03727 
(<.0001) 
0.29196 
(<.0001) 
-0.08622 
(<.0001) 
-0.04927 
(<.0001) 
-0.06305 
(<.0001) 
AVG_IA5  -0.01580 
(0.0228) 
0.08360 
(<.0001) 
-0.10778 
(<.0001) 
-0.04933 
(<.0001) 
-0.04680 
(<.0001) 
-0.08958 
(<.0001) 
-0.00760 
(0.3983) 
INTANG   -0.09919 
(<.0001) 
0.11319 
(<.0001) 
-0.04054 
(<.0001) 
0.20996 
(<.0001) 
0.07194 
(<.0001) 
-0.00929 
(0.3016) 
VOL_RET    -0.43947 
(<.0001) 
-0.05422 
(<.0001) 
-0.15606 
(<.0001) 
-0.41036 
(<.0001) 
0.06743 
(<.0001) 
AVG_SIZE     0.04132 
(<.0001) 
0.37177 
(<.0001) 
0.92498 
(<.0001) 
0.01191 
(0.1856) 
ARET      0.02364 
(0.0007) 
0.03522 
(<.0001) 
0.03870 
(<.0001) 
Ln(INS_ 
OWN) 
      0.48475 
(<.0001) 
0.08413 
(<.0001) 
Ln(OWN_ 
BRD 
       0.00043 
(0.9620) 
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1.4.2  Performance of the Prediction Model for Absolute Forecast Errors 
 In Table 1.3, we report the results of the model predicting absolute 
forecast errors (Equation (2)). As suggested by Petersen (2009), for panel 
regressions when the dependent variable is highly persistent, the correlation of 
residuals within a firm across years (time-series dependence) is of great concern. 
Petersen (2009) suggests two types of regression models to address for this type 
of dependence: a) pooled OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by firm, 
and b) firm fixed-effect regressions. The regressions are performed for the whole 
sample period (1983-2007)57. To ensure that only ex-ante information is used for 
the prediction of IA, we lag certain variables by one year. These variables, like 
brokerage firm size, forecast frequency, etc, require the full-year information and 
thus are not observable until the end of a year. 
 The signs of the variables’ coefficients are largely consistent with our 
expectations. The current absolute forecast error is highly correlated with the 
absolute forecast error from last year, which also confirms that the dependent 
variable is persistent and the regressions accounting for the time-series 
dependence are appropriate. The result shows that inaccuracy is high, for 
analysts with long forecast horizon (FCST_HRZN) and short firm experience 
(EXPRNCE). It is also shown that the effort the analyst allocates to the firm also 
influences the forecast accuracy. When the analyst issues fewer forecasts for the 
firm during the fiscal year (FCST_FREQ) and is following large number of other 
                                                 
7 For constructing the IA measure, the prediction model is estimated based on a historical rolling 
window of 5, 7, or 9 years to avoid any look-ahead bias, and we use pooled OLS regression to 
obtain the residuals of the model, since the residuals from the firm fixed-effect regression are 
demeaned within the firm across years, which make the residuals not comparable across firms. 
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firms at the same time (COMP_NUM), her forecast accuracy tends to be 
lower6F 8 . Also as expected, analysts from larger brokerage houses 
(BROKER_SIZE) issue more accurate forecasts. Forecasts that are not the first 
ones among all analysts’ forecasts for the current fiscal period (HERD_DUM) are 
associated with lower accuracy, consistent with the notion that they are indicative 
of herding behavior. The forecasts that are issued long after the last forecast 
(DAYS_ELPS) have higher accuracy, consistent with the explanation that more 
information regarding the firm may be made available to analysts during the 
period between two forecasts. Besides the analyst characteristics, firm 
characteristics also play an important role in determining absolute forecast errors. 
Forecast inaccuracy is lower for firms with larger size (SIZE), more growth 
opportunities (M/B), fewer business segments (BUSSEG_NUM) and less volatile 
earnings (VAR_EPS)7F 9 . Overall, the model encompasses almost all the 
variables that are known to have predictive power for analyst forecast accuracy. 
The high adjusted R-square (39% for the clustered regression) also confirms that 
the model can capture a substantial portion of the predictable variations in actual 
absolute forecast errors. 
                                                 
8
 Unlike the effect of COMP_NUM on forecast accuracy, we find that accuracy increases with the 
number of industries the analyst follows (IND_NUM), which is not consistent with the findings of 
Clement (1999). One possible explanation for this effect is that brokers prefer to assign their best 
analysts to cover more industries. Another explanation is that analysts covering several industries 
can take advantage of information spillover effect across industries. 
9
 The sign of the earnings volatility variable is positive, as we expected, in the clustered 
regression. However, the sign switches to negative in the firm fixed-effect regression. This is 
likely due to certain econometric imperfections. 
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Table 1.3 
Predicting the Analysts’ Absolute Forecast Errors 
 
This table reports results of regressions of the log of absolute forecast errors for analyst i 
following firm j in year t on various ex ante variables that capture both analyst and firm 
characteristics. Variables are defined in Table I. The clustered regression is the pooled OLS 
regression where the standard errors are clustered by firm. Both year dummies and industry 
dummies are included in all the regressions. Industry dummies are defined using Fama-French 
12-industry classifications. The sample period is from 1983 to 2007. The t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(FCST_ERRijt) 
 Clustered Regression (by Firm) Firm Fixed-Effect Regression 
Ln(FCST_ERRij(t-1)) 0.43481*** 0.13200*** 
 (53.76) (66.78) 
Ln(FCST_HRZNijt) 0.71277*** 0.68303*** 
 (53.58) (95.6) 
HERD_DUMijt 0.07148*** 0.02765*** 
 (6.35) (3.39) 
Ln(DAYS_ELPSijt) -.05374*** -.02944*** 
 (-10.99) (-8.79) 
Ln(EXPRNCEijt) -.02658*** -.01162** 
 (-3.16) (-2.3) 
Ln(BROKER_SIZE ij(t-1)) 0.00058 -.00976*** 
 (0.16) (-3.99) 
Ln(FCST_FREQ ij(t-1)) -.13579*** -.06018*** 
 (-14.24) (-13.44) 
Ln(COMP_NUM i(t-1)) 0.02587** 0.04423*** 
 (2.35) (8.35) 
Ln(IND_NUM i(t-1)) -.04391*** -.02142*** 
 (-3.37) (-3.82) 
Ln(SIZEijt) -.18224*** -.15569*** 
 (-19.49) (-30.3) 
M/Bijt -.05614*** -.04898*** 
 (-16.57) (-46.32) 
Ln(BUSSEG_NUMj(t-1)) 0.01916 0.06541*** 
 (0.99) (9.07) 
Ln(VAR_EPSjt) 0.05242*** -.00860*** 
 (11.19) (-5.3) 
Adjusted R-square 38.92% 54.00% 
Industry and Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Num of Observations 264928 264928 
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1.4.3  Event Returns by Information Ambiguity 
 The first set of empirical tests examines the cross-sectional variations in 
market responses across forecasts with differing levels of IA. The market 
response is measured as the three-trading-day cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR3) over the period surrounding the analyst’s forecast announcement date, 
i.e., from day t-1 to t+1. We compute the abnormal return by subtracting the 
concurrent value-weighted market return from the firm’s daily returns. In Table IV, 
Panel A, Part I, forecasts are sorted into IA quintiles every year. CAR3s for 
analysts’ forecasts are generally positive. This is consistent with the findings of 
Xu (2007) that the market response to actual earnings announcement is on 
average positive. More interestingly, we find that CAR3 is less positive for highly 
ambiguous forecasts. One potential explanation for this pattern is that the market 
is responding to bad news more strongly relative to good news when facing 
ambiguous information, as predicted by Epstein and Schneider (ES 2003, 2008). 
 To confirm this prediction, we first classify forecasts into good- and bad-
news groups based on the direction of forecast revisions, and then within each 
news group forecasts are further sorted into IA quintiles every year. Since we are 
using the first forecast of each analyst during the fiscal year, the most relevant 
benchmark for calculating the revision should be the actual earnings of the last 
fiscal year8F10. Therefore, the forecast revision (FCST_REV) is calculated as the 
                                                 
10
 Gleason and Lee (2003) recommend using the analyst’s own prior forecast as a benchmark. 
For the first forecasts, these prior forecasts should be the analyst’s final forecasts for the last 
fiscal-year earnings. Since we require that the forecasts must be made after the announcement of 
last-fiscal-year earnings, this benchmark is likely to be outdated information and the market must 
have updated its expectation based on the announced earnings. 
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forecast less the actual earnings of the last fiscal year scaled by the end-of-day 
stock price two days before the forecast date. Table IV, Panel A, Part II shows 
that for downward revisions high-IA forecasts are associated with stronger 
negative reactions than low-IA ones, which is consistent with the ES theory. The 
average CAR3 of the highest-IA bad-news quintile is -1.13%, which is 0.37% 
lower than the CAR3 of the lowest-IA bad-news quintile.  
However, from Table 1.4 Panel A Part II, we cannot observe any 
significant pattern across IA quintiles for upward revisions. This is likely due to 
the problem associated with classifying upward revisions as good news. It is well-
known that the first forecasts tend to be overly optimistic and thus are more likely 
to be higher than last-fiscal-year earnings. For example, Richardson, et al. (2004) 
document that the median consensus forecasts tend to be initially positively 
biased. Subsequently, analysts gradually “walk down” the forecasts to a level that 
is beatable by the actual earnings. Our result also shows that around 83% of the 
first forecasts are upward revisions relative to last-fiscal-year earnings. Given this 
fact, rational investors should systematically discount the upward revisions. To 
account for the systematic optimistic bias in the first forecasts, we use a trend-
adjusted forecast revision measure (FCST_REV2), which is the forecast revision 
by analyst i following firm j in year t less the historical average of forecast 
revisions by analyst i following firm j during the period from year t-3 to year t-1, 
and we classify the forecasts with positive FCST_REV2 as good news. After this 
adjustment, as shown in Table 1.4 Panel A Part III, the size of the good-news 
group becomes more reasonable and is reduced to 56% of the total sample. For 
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the revised good-news group, we find that the market is responding less 
positively when the forecasts are ambiguous, as predicted by the ES theory. On 
average, the good-news high-IA forecasts have an event return of 0.45%, 
compared to 0.69% for good-news low-IA forecasts. Instead of classifying all the 
negative trend-adjusted revisions as bad news, we keep the prior definition that 
downward revisions are bad news, and classify forecasts that are higher than 
last-fiscal-year earnings (FCST_REV > 0) but lower than the previous three-year 
average (FCST_REV2 < 0) into a neutral-news group. Market reactions to the 
neutral-news forecasts are generally weak and close to 0. More importantly, the 
nature of these forecasts is mixed. For example, the average CAR3 is positive for 
the highest-IA quintile but it is negative for other quintiles. Therefore, any attempt 
to classify this group as either good or bad news will be associated with a great 
deal of noise. Interestingly, we can see that for the neutral-news group there is 
little response to forecasts with highest IAs (mean CAR3 equals to 0.07%) 
whereas for other IA quintiles the average market reaction is slightly negative, 
suggesting that the market tends to adopt a more optimistic view when the news 
is neutral and ambiguous11.  
 In order to compare the IA effect with the IP effect on the market’s 
response to forecast revisions, we also sort forecasts by their expected IP every 
year. Following Clement and Tse (2003), we use the predicted values 
(PRED_lnERR) from the model predicting forecast errors (Equation (2)) to proxy 
for the market’s expectation of forecast errors. Table IV Panel B shows that 
                                                 
11
 Since the existing theories, to our best knowledge, offer few predictions on how the market 
should react to the neutral news, we leave the interpretation on this result for future studies. 
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compared with IA, IP has a distinctive effect on the event returns, especially on 
the bad-news side. For the bad-news, the highest-PRED_lnERR forecasts are 
associated with an average CAR3 of -0.65%, which is far less than the response 
to bad-news lowest-PRED_lnERR forecasts where mean CAR3 equals to -1.34%. 
Overall, the results for sorting on PRED_lnERR suggest that the market takes 
both highly inaccurate good and bad news less seriously. This is consistent with 
prior findings of Stickel (1992), Park and Stice (2000), and Clement and Tse 
(2003).  
Table 1.4 
Market Reaction to Analysts’ Forecasts across IA Quintiles 
 
In Panel A, the reported are means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the cumulative 3-
day abnormal returns surrounding forecast announcements (CAR3) across years and analyst-firm 
pairs. In Panel A-Part I, The observations are sorted into quintiles based on IA5 every year. In 
Panel A-Part II, Good (bad) news is defined as an upward (downward) forecast revision, i.e., 
FCST_REV > (<) 0. The observations are first sorted into good/bad news groups every year, and 
within each news group we further sort the stocks into quintiles based on IA5. In Panel A-Part III, 
Good news is defined as an upward adjusted forecast revision, i.e., FCST_REV2 > 0, whereas 
bad news is defined as a downward forecast revision, i.e., FCST_REV < 0.  The observations are 
first sorted into three groups (good, bad and neutral news) every year, and within each news 
group they are further sorted the stocks into quintiles based on IA5. In Panel B, Good news is 
defined as an upward adjusted forecast revision, i.e., FCST_REV2 > 0, whereas bad news is 
defined as a downward forecast revision, i.e., FCST_REV < 0.  The observations are first sorted 
into three groups (good, bad and neutral news) every year, and within each news group they are 
further sorted the stocks into quintiles based on the predicted forecast errors (PRED_lnERR5). 
Variables are defined in Table I. T-statistics for the group mean differences are reported in 
brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 
Mean CAR3 Surrounding Forecast Announcements (in %) 
Panel A. Across IA5 Quintiles 
Part I. Univariate Sorting 
   IA5 Q5– Q1 
  N Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (High)  [t-stat]   
All stocks 
83139 
(100%) 
0.1942 
(5.682) 
0.1592 
(5.586) 
0.1209 
(5.468) 
0.0806 
(5.636 
0.0238 
(5.901) 
-0.1705*** 
[2.68] 
Part II. Good or Bad News based on Raw Forecast Revision  
   IA5 Q5– Q1 
  N Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (High)  [t-stat]   
FCST_REV > 0 
(Good News) 
67969 
(82.5%) 
0.3987 
(5.554) 
0.3835 
(5.466) 
0.3368 
(5.370) 
0.3298 
(5.456) 
0.3113 
(5.802) 
-0.0873 
[1.27] 
FCST_REV < 0 
(Bad News) 
14454 
(17.5%) 
-.7570 
(6.180) 
-.9027 
(5.931) 
-.8742 
(5.864) 
-1.081 
(6.240) 
-1.130 
(6.140) 
-0.3728** 
[2.30] 
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Part III. Good or Bad News based on Raw & Adjusted Forecast Revision 
   IA5 Q5– Q1 
  N Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (High)  [t-stat]   
FCST_REV2 > 0 
(Good News) 
43813 
(55.7%) 
0.6890 
(5.576) 
0.6574 
(5.536) 
0.5851 
(5.447) 
0.5852 
(5.571) 
0.4534 
(5.870) 
-0.2356*** 
[2.72] 
FCST_REV < 0 
(Bad News) 
14454 
(18.4%) 
-.7570 
(6.180) 
-.9027 
(5.931) 
-.8742 
(5.864) 
-1.081 
(6.240) 
-1.130 
(6.140) 
-0.3728** 
[2.30] 
Others 
(Neutral News) 
20392 
(25.9%) 
-.1696 
(5.524) 
-.1738 
(5.223) 
-.1285 
(5.271) 
-.1386 
(5.275) 
0.0708 
(5.675) 
0.2400** 
[2.14] 
 
Panel B. Across PRED_lnERR5 Quintiles 
   PRED_lnERR5 Q5– Q1 
  N Q1(low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (High)  [t-stat]   
FCST_REV2 > 0 
(Good News) 
43813 
(55.7%) 
0.6190 
(4.959) 
0.6671 
(5.173) 
0.6444 
(5.329) 
0.6517 
(5.701) 
0.3879 
(6.680) 
-0.2312*** 
[2.60] 
FCST_REV < 0 
(Bad News) 
14454 
(18.4%) 
-1.3365 
(5.793) 
-0.8596 
(5.794) 
-0.9049 
(5.599) 
-0.9974 
(6.011) 
-0.6475 
(7.045) 
0.689*** 
[4.06] 
Others 
(Neutral News) 
20392 
(25.9%) 
-0.3847 
(4.957) 
-0.2029 
(5.065) 
-0.0572 
(5.012) 
0.1291 
(5.488) 
-0.0244 
(6.325) 
0.360*** 
[3.16] 
 
1.4.4  Regression Analysis 
 In this section, we examine whether the ambiguity effect can be explained 
by other factors that are known to influence market responses to forecast 
revisions. For example, if the highly ambiguous bad news were to be associated 
with more negative forecast revisions, the more negative response to this type of 
news may simply be a manifestation of this correlation. However, as shown in 
Table 1.2 Panel D the correlation between IA and FCST_REV is not very high, 
equal to 3.4%. Here, we control for all the factors that are suggested by Clement 
and Tse (2003), and the market response to forecast revisions is modeled as: 
ijt
n
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    (4) 
where BAD_NEWS is a dummy variable that equals to one if the raw revision is 
downward (FCST_REV < 0), and GOOD_NEWS is also a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the revision is above the three-year trend (FCST_REV2 > 0). We 
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expect the coefficient for the GOOD_NEWS ( 3γ ) to be positive and for the 
BAD_NEWS ( 2γ ) to be negative. Our main prediction is that the coefficients for 
the two interaction terms with IA5 ( 4γ  and 5γ ) are both negative, because we 
expect that the response to good news )5( 53 ijtIA⋅+ γγ  will be less positive when 
the IA is higher, whereas the response to bad news )5( 42 ijtIA⋅+ γγ  will be more 
negative when the IA is higher. Since the prior studies suggest that expected 
forecast error will reduce the market response for any given level of forecast 
revision ( ijtERRPRED 5ln_71 ⋅+ γγ ) regardless of the nature of news, it is also 
expected that the coefficient for the interaction term with PRED_lnERR ( 7γ ) will 
be negative.  
 Since the dependent variable in this model is stock return, which is more 
correlated across firms within each period than across time within each firm, we 
follow the suggestions of Petersen (2009) and estimate Equation (4) by Fama-
MacBeth year-by-year cross-sectional regressions and pooled OLS regressions 
with standard errors clustered by year to account for the cross-sectional 
dependency. As shown in Table V, the coefficients for interaction terms with IA5 
( 4γ  and 5γ ) are always negative, as we expected, under the two types of 
regressions. Also consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the market is less 
responsive when the expected forecast errors are high, as shown by the 
significantly negative 
7γ . Similar to the prior sorting results, it is also shown that 
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investors tend to respond more favorably to highly ambiguous neutral news than 
other neutral news, as reflected by significantly positive 
6γ . 
 31 
Table 1.5 Regression Analysis of Market Reaction to Analysts’ Forecasts 
This table reports results of regressions of the cumulative abnormal announcement returns for the forecasts made by analyst i following firm j in year t on various variables. 
Variables are defined in Table I. The clustered regression is the pooled OLS regression where the standard errors are clustered by year. For the Fama-MacBeth regression, 
the coefficients are the mean of coefficients from year-by-year cross-sectional regressions, while the standard errors are adjusted by New-West procedure with a lag of three 
years. The sample period is from 1994 to 2007. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: CAR3ijt (in %) 
 Fama-MacBeth Regressions Clustered Regressions (by Year) 
Intercept 0.1331** -0.0876** -0.2180*** -0.2052*** -0.2149*** -0.2202** -.0762 -0.2119** 
                   (2.21) (-2.76) (-5.08) (-4.69) (-4.86) (-2.84) (-1.14) (-2.64) 
FCST_REV2ijt 7.6677*** -0.5592 -0.4699 -12.727*** 11.0672 -0.0901 -11.150*** 9.5198 
                   (6.52) (-0.61) (-0.5) (-3.27) (0.87) (-0.08) (-3.35) (0.83) 
BAD_NEWSijt  -0.9699*** -0.5835*** -0.5677*** -0.5676*** -0.5347*** -.6353*** -0.5066** 
                    (-5.48) (-3.16) (-3.12) (-3.19) (-3.07) (-4.4) (-2.9) 
GOOD_NEWSijt  0.7296*** 0.9724*** 0.9453*** 0.9629*** 0.9289*** 0.7746*** 0.9123*** 
                    (4.36) (5.63) (5.64) (5.62) (6.31) (5.3) (6.11) 
BAD_NEWSijt·IA5ijt   -0.2247*** -0.2052*** -0.2054*** -0.2199*** -.2069*** -0.1998** 
                     (-4.56) (-4.44) (-4.09) (-3.12) (-3.04) (-2.85) 
GOOD_NEWSijt·IA5ijt   -0.1071*** -0.1166*** -0.1211*** -0.1104** -.1179** -0.1216** 
                     (-3.72) (-3.94) (-3.97) (-2.29) (-2.36) (-2.45) 
NEUTRAL_NEWSijt·IA5ijt   0.1222** 0.1324*** 0.1342*** 0.1119** 0.1232** 0.1245** 
   (2.97) (3.21) (3.08) (2.51) (2.64) (2.75) 
FCST_REV2ijt· PRED_lnERR5ijt    -3.1615***   -2.8756***  
    (-3.14)   (-3.16)  
FCST_REV2ijt· HERD_DUMijt     -8.3780***   -8.2676*** 
                       (-3.49)   (-3.63) 
FCST_REV2ijt·Ln(DAYS_ELPSijt)     0.8446   0.8815 
                       (1.13)   (1.13) 
FCST_REV2ijt·Ln(FCST_HRZNijt)     -3.5515   -3.3662 
                       (-1.63)   (-1.6) 
FCST_REV2ijt·Ln(FCST_ERR ij(t-1))     -1.5046**   -1.7754** 
                       (-2.95)   (-2.75) 
FCST_REV2ijt·Ln(BROKER_SIZE ij(t-1))     2.0097***   1.9526** 
                       (4.07)   (2.4) 
Adjusted R-square 0.26% 1.25% 1.29% 1.34% 1.45% 1.07% 1.08% 1.15% 
Num of Observations 82684 82684 82684 82684 82684 82684 82684 82684 
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1.4.5 Robustness Analysis 
1.4.5.1 Other Controls 
Clement and Tse (2003) find that investors seem to be unable to condition 
their responses to forecasts on all the information that the analyst characteristics 
provide about future forecast accuracy. In particular, when investors respond to 
forecasts, they are more concerned with a subset of the variables that predicts 
the forecast accuracy, such as broker size, days elapsed from the last forecasts, 
lagged forecast error, and forecast horizon. So instead of using PRED_lnERR 
which is based on the full information, we also try to interact the forecast revision 
with each of these variables that investors deem to be important. From Table 1.5, 
we can see that including these interaction terms does not alter our main results. 
1.4.5.2 Alternative Measurement Windows for IA Estimates 
To check if the results are sensitive to the length of rolling window used in 
the estimation of IAs, we re-estimate IAs using seven- and nine-year rolling 
windows and then repeat the regression tests. From Table 1.2 Panel D, we can 
see that IA5 is highly correlated with IA7 and IA9 and the correlations are 
hovering around the 95% level. In Table 1.6 where IA5 and PRED_lnERR5 are 
replaced by the corresponding variables estimated over seven- or nine-year 
windows, the regression results are virtually the same as those in Table V. 
Therefore, our result is robust to the alternative length of the estimation rolling 
window. 
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1.4.5.3 Sub-period Analysis 
 Here, we examine if the previously discovered relation between IA and 
market reaction is consistent over time. Since our sample period is surrounding 
the Tech Bubble period, it is divided into four sub-periods accordingly: pre-bubble 
(1994-1998), bubble (1999-2000), bubble-bursting (2001-2002), and post-bubble 
periods (2003-2007). From Table 1.7, the signs for coefficients of the interaction 
terms between IA and good/new news are fairly consistent and remain negative 
for most sub-periods, similar to what we find in Table V. The only exception is the 
sign for GOOD_NEWSijt·IA5ijt  during bubble-bursting period. Overall, the result 
is much weaker for bubble-bursting period, but stronger for post-bubble and 
bubble period. One possible explanation is that when Tech Bubble bursted, the 
market is in panic mood and investors simply treated all bad news seriously and 
ignored all good news, regardless of the IA level of the news. 
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Table 1.6 
Robustness Analysis I: Alternative Measurement Windows for IA Estimates 
 
This table reports results of regressions of the cumulative abnormal announcement returns for the 
forecasts made by analyst i following firm j in year t on various variables. Variables are defined in 
Table I. For the Fama-MacBeth regression, the coefficients are the mean of coefficients from 
year-by-year cross-sectional regressions, while the standard errors are adjusted by New-West 
procedure with a lag of three years. The sample period is from 1994 to 2007. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: CAR3ijt (in %) 
 Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
Intercept -.22818*** -.23649*** -.22485*** -.23364*** 
                   (-5.15) (-5.3) (-5.09) (-5.28) 
FCST_REV2ijt -11.721*** 11.2208 -11.722*** 11.1619 
                   (-3.5) (0.88) (-3.5) (0.88) 
BAD_NEWSijt -.55417*** -.55173*** -.55700** -.55398*** 
                   (-3.11) (-3.19) (-3.01) (-3.08) 
GOOD_NEWSijt 0.98804*** 1.00280*** 0.99109*** 1.00725*** 
                   (5.59) (5.6) (5.63) (5.63) 
BAD_NEWSijt·IA7ijt -.19843*** -.19929***   
                   (-4.26) (-3.96)   
GOOD_NEWSijt·IA7ijt -.13314*** -.13728***   
                   (-4.52) (-4.64)   
NEUTRAL_NEWSijt·IA7ijt 0.15059*** 0.15248***   
 (3.28) (3.14)   
BAD_NEWSijt·IA9ijt   -.19662*** -.19802*** 
                     (-4.14) (-3.91) 
GOOD_NEWSijt·IA9ijt   -.13848*** -.14273*** 
                     (-4.47) (-4.55) 
NEUTRAL_NEWSijt·IA9ijt   0.14744*** 0.14921*** 
   (3.31) (3.18) 
FCST_REV2ijt· PRED_lnERR7ijt -2.9283***    
 (-3.32)    
FCST_REV2ijt· PRED_lnERR9ijt   -2.9463***  
   (-3.36)  
FCST_REV2ijt· HERD_DUMijt  -8.3778***  -8.3724*** 
                    (-3.47)  (-3.48) 
FCST_REV2ijt·Ln(DAYS_ELPSijt)  0.83528  0.83259 
                    (1.12)  (1.12) 
FCST_REV2ijt·Ln(FCST_HRZNijt)  -3.5742  -3.5606 
                    (-1.65)  (-1.64) 
FCST_REV2ijt·Ln(FCST_ERR ij(t-1))  -1.5047**  -1.5023** 
                    (-2.93)  (-2.92) 
FCST_REV2ijt·Ln(BROKER_SIZE ij(t-1))  2.00857***  2.00836*** 
                    (4.05)  (4.05) 
Adjusted R-square 1.33% 1.45% 1.33% 1.45% 
Num of Observations   82684   82684   82684   82684 
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Table 1.7 
Robustness Analysis II: Sub-period Analysis 
 
This table reports results of regressions of the cumulative abnormal announcement returns for the 
forecasts made by analyst i following firm j in year t on various variables. Variables are defined in 
Table I. The regression used is the pooled OLS regression where the standard errors are 
clustered by year. The sample period is from 1994 to 2007. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: CAR3ijt (in %) 
 Pre-bubble 
Period 
(1994-1998) 
Bubble 
Period 
(1999-2000) 
Bubble- 
bursting 
Period 
(2001-2002) 
Post- 
bubble 
Period 
(2003-2007) 
Intercept -0.3004*** 0.1141 -0.5942 -0.1228 
 (-8.47) (1.02) (-1.36) (-0.87) 
FCST_REV2ijt -3.2919 -27.679** -9.0422 -16.997** 
 (-0.41) (-2.49) (-0.74) (-4.36) 
BAD_NEWSijt -0.2893 -0.5163 -0.2230 -0.8532* 
 (-1.32) (-0.54) (-0.36) (-2.77) 
GOOD_NEWSijt 0.5725** 0.7841*** 1.5838*** 1.1121*** 
 (3.18) (8.44) (6.33) (3.81) 
BAD_NEWSijt·IA5ijt -0.1152 -0.5006*** -0.0113 -0.2788** 
 (-1.39) (-4.79) (-0.05) (-3.42) 
GOOD_NEWSijt·IA5ijt -0.0636 -0.2670 0.0567 -0.1664*** 
 (-0.72) (-1.47) (1.28) (-2.57) 
NEUTRAL_NEWSijt·IA5ijt 0.1521** 0.1275 0.3727 0.0250 
 (2.24) (0.83) (1.49) (0.99) 
FCST_REV2ijt· PRED_lnERR5ijt -0.8694 -8.6567** -1.0151 -3.9576*** 
 (-0.45) (-2.39) (-0.27) (-3.99) 
Adjusted R-square      32371      11985       9417      28911 
Num of Observations 0.5591% 1.141% 1.076% 1.872% 
 
 
1.5 The Ambiguity Effect on Stock Return Skewness 
1.5.1  Data and Measures 
 In this section, we aggregate analyst-firm-level IA at the firm level and 
examine whether firm-level IA can explain cross-sectional variations in stock 
return skewness. This test also serves the purpose of validating whether the IA 
measure estimated based on analysts’ forecast information can be used as a 
general proxy for the average ambiguity level of various information that a firm is 
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exposed to during a certain time period. Skewness is calculated using daily log 
returns10F12, i.e., ln(1+r), from CRSP data. Although we would prefer a short 
measurement period for skewness as it may vary over time, we also need 
sufficient observations to ensure a reliable estimate of skewness. As a 
compromise, we follow Xu (2007) and measure skewness over a one-year period, 
starting from Jan 1st to Dec 31st. We exclude the firm-year observations where 
less than 40 valid daily return observations are available. Skewness is defined as 
the third-order decentralized moment: 
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where x  and xσˆ  are sample mean and standard deviation respectively. Since 
skewness is measured at the firm level, we also need to aggregate the prior IAs 
estimates for each analyst forecast to the firm level. So IA for firm j in year t 
(AVG_IA5) is calculated as the average of IAs for the forecasts that are made by 
all the analysts following firm j during year t11F13.  
As discussed earlier, the ambiguity level for a firm during a one-year 
period is not only determined by the average level of IA for each piece of news 
but also by the arrival frequency of the ambiguous news relative to the 
unambiguous news. We use the current fiscal-year-end intangible assets plus 
goodwill scaled by total assets (INTANG)12F14 as a proxy for the relative arrival 
                                                 
12
 Since raw returns are left censored at -100% and thus more positively skewed, following Xu 
(2007) we use log returns. 
13 Here, we are still limiting the forecasts to be the first one made by each analyst during the fiscal 
year. 
14
 We assume the intangible asset and goodwill to be zero, if a firm does not report these items. 
The main results are qualitatively the same, if we treat these values as missing.  
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rates of tangible and intangible signals for the firm. For firms with many intangible 
assets, the true value of their intangible assets is a major focus for investors. It is 
expected that there will be more speculative information regarding the value of 
those intangible assets (intangible signals) for these firms. Moreover, it is hard for 
the periodical disclosures in firms’ financial statements (tangible signals) to fully 
resolve the ambiguity in those intangible signals, since the true value of 
intangible assets can only be revealed in the long run. Therefore, the 
“corrections” resulted from the announcement of tangible signals should also be 
weaker for firms with more intangible assets. Overall, we expect that the firms 
with high level of IA and high level of intangible assets have more negatively 
skewed stock returns. 
 The empirical test is based on the following model of the stock return 
skewness: 
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Since our main purpose here is to explain, rather than predict, the stock return 
skewness, the dependent and independent variables (except for the lagged 
annual returns) are measured contemporaneously. Accordingly, the IA5 measure 
is constructed using the rolling window of the previous four years plus the current 
year, instead of the rolling window of the previous five years. 
The control variables are the determinants of skewness suggested by Xu 
(2007). Specifically, he argues that when investors face short-sale constraints 
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and disagree on the precision of public signals, the equilibrium stock price is a 
convex function of the public signal, which induces stock returns to be positively 
skewed. To proxy for short-sale costs, we use the average market capitalization 
(AVG_SIZE), institutional ownership (INS_OWN), and ownership breadth 
(OWN_BRD). AVG_SIZE is defined as the annual average of daily market 
capitalizations from CRSP13F15. INS_OWN is measured as the proportion of 
shares outstanding that are held by financial institutions recorded in Thomson 
Reuters 13(f) Institutional Holding Database. D’Avolio (2002) shows that large 
stocks and stocks with high institutional ownership are easier to be short. 
OWN_BRD is the number of 13(f) financial institutions holding the stock scaled 
by total number of 13(f) financial institutions at that time14F16. More institutions 
holding the stock usually means more competitions among the stock lenders and 
thus lower short-sale costs (Xu (2007)). To proxy for investors’ disagreement, we 
use the detrended turnover ratio (DETRND_TO) (see Varian (1989), Harris and 
Raviv (1993) among others), constructed as the annual average of daily 
detrended turnovers. The daily detrended turnover is the ratio of daily share 
volume to total shares outstanding and detrended by a moving average of past 
20-trading-days’ turnover. Since the volume data for NASDAQ stocks are 
partially double-counted and thus incomparable with the volume data for stocks 
from other exchanges, we only estimate DETRND_TO for NYSE and AMEX 
stocks. Consequently, the regression of Equation (6) is performed only for the 
                                                 
15  We measure market capitalization over a period, instead of on a certain day, because 
skewness is also constructed in a similar manner. 
16
 Both INS_OWN and OWN_BRD are available at quarterly frequency from Thomson Reuters 
13(f) Institutional Holdings Database, and are calculated as the annual average of quarterly data. 
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NYSE and AMEX subsample, when DETRND_TO is included. Current and 
lagged annual returns are also included, because Xu (2007) shows that a) price 
convexity increases stock return skewness and contemporaneous expected 
market return simultaneously, which causes skewness to be positively correlated 
with current returns, and b) lagged returns are expected to be negatively 
correlated with skewness due to corrections to previous over- or under-reaction. 
1.5.2 The Results 
 Table 1.8 reports the regression estimates of the stock return skewness 
model (Equation (6)).  The model is estimated using the pooled OLS regression 
with standard errors clustered by firm. To account for potential correlations of 
skewness across firms within a certain year, we also include year (and industry) 
dummies. In Table 1.8, Column (1), as we expected, the stock return is shown to 
be more negatively skewed if the average level of IA during the year is high. Also 
consistent with our hypothesis, Column (2) shows that the interaction term of 
AVG_IA5 and INTANG is significantly negative. In other words, when firm-
specific news is highly ambiguous and the arriving frequency of such ambiguous 
news relative to unambiguous news is high, the stock return is more negatively 
skewed. It is also shown that the interaction term is more accurately capturing 
the ambiguity effect on skewness. After other control variables are included, 
AVG_IA5 is no longer significant but the interaction term retains its explanatory 
power. 
 Most of the signs for the control variables are consistent with the findings 
of Xu (2007). Stock return skewness increases with current annual return while it 
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decreases with previous annual returns. Stock returns are more negatively 
skewed when the short-sale constraints for the stock are less binding (for 
example, in the case of large firms, firms with high institutional ownership, and 
firms with high ownership breadth). We also find that the return is more 
negatively skewed when stock volatility is high, which can be attributed to the 
asymmetric volatility effect. Previous studies (see Black (1976), Christie (1982), 
and Glosten, et al. (1993)) have documented that stocks tend to have higher 
volatilities following negative returns than following positive returns, therefore 
negative skewness is expected be associated with higher volatilities. The only 
result that is not consistent with the findings of Xu (2007) is that skewness is 
negatively associated with detrended turnover. It is possible that detrended 
turnover is not a good proxy for disagreement. 
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Table 1.8 
The Determinants of Stock Return Skewness 
 
This table reports results of regressions of the skewness of the daily stock returns on firm j in year 
t on various variables. Variables are defined in Table I. The clustered regression is the pooled 
OLS regression where the standard errors are clustered by firm. The sample period is from 1994 
to 2007. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-
, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable: SKEWjt 
 Clustered Regression (by Firm) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Interceptjt 0.1385*** 0.1411*** -0.9434*** -2.1073*** -2.2867*** 
 (3.29) (3.32) (-8.61) (-6.54) (-5.51) 
AVG_IA5jt -0.0795*** -0.0550*** -0.0220 -0.0235 -0.0132 
 (-5.1) (-3.37) (-1.44) (-1.56) (-0.63) 
AVG_IA5jt 
·INTANGjt 
 -0.1205*** 
(-4.14) 
-0.1548*** 
(-5.53) 
-0.1363*** 
(-4.95) 
-0.1773*** 
(-4.97) 
      
ARETjt   0.6578*** 0.6581*** 0.7125*** 
   (37.15) (37.19) (25.95) 
ARETj(t-1)   -0.1027*** -0.0977*** -0.1029*** 
   (-6.82) (-6.45) (-4.64) 
ARETj(t-2)   -0.0624*** -0.0580*** -0.0745*** 
   (-4.3) (-4.02) (-3.4) 
ARETj(t-3)   -0.0325** -0.0289** -0.0636*** 
   (-2.55) (-2.28) (-3.23) 
Ln(VOL_RETjt)   -0.5723*** -0.5849*** -0.5619*** 
   (-18.65) (-18.89) (-13.72) 
AVG_SIZEjt   -0.0886*** -0.0314* -0.0140 
   (-15.59) (-1.74) (-0.6) 
Ln(INS_OWNjt)    -0.1474*** -0.0762** 
    (-5.85) (-2.22) 
Ln(OWN_BRDjt)    -0.0831** -0.1347*** 
    (-2.38) (-2.9) 
DETRN_TOjt     -0.4916*** 
     (-5.55) 
Adjusted R-
square 
1.442% 1.561% 13.48% 14.00% 14.09% 
Industry and 
Year Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num of 
Observations 
20765 20765 20765 20763 12359 
(NYSE & 
AMEX only) 
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1.6 Conclusion 
Defining ambiguity as investor’s uncertainty about the precision of 
observed information, this paper constructs an empirical measure of ambiguity 
based on analysts’ earnings forecast information, and finds that the market tends 
to react more negatively to highly ambiguous bad news, while it tends to be less 
responsive to highly ambiguous good news. This result supports the theoretical 
findings by ES (2003, 2008), who argue that ambiguity-averse investors take a 
worst-case assessment of the information precision when the information 
precision is unknown. In addition, this paper shows that for the stocks exposed to 
highly ambiguous and intangible information, their returns are more negatively 
skewed.  
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Chapter 2 
Informed Investors’ Trade-Size Choice:  
Evidence from Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Announcements 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates trade-size choice by informed investors. Barclay 
and Warner (1993) argue that the informed, who tend to trade large amount of 
shares to fully take advantage of their private information, should prefer breaking 
up the trade into medium-size orders. Compared to one large trade, several 
medium trades are less likely to be noticed by the uninformed and/or regulators. 
Furthermore, as suggested by Seppi (1990), large trades (or block trades) are 
usually executed through negotiations with dealers in the “upstairs market”. 
Therefore, there is no anonymity and the party initiating such block trades 
subjects to “no-bagging-the-street” commitment17. Given these constraints and 
the assumption that the size of block trades is capped at a relatively low level, 
Seppi (1990) shows that it is optimal for informed traders to avoid block trades 
and use smaller trades executed by the market specialists instead, since 
informed investors can accumulate much larger positions through a series of 
smaller trades than through “one-shot” block trade, and hence higher trading 
profits. On the other hand, using too small trades is both costly and slow. There 
is usually a fixed transaction cost associated with each trade. Moreover, the 
informed run the risk that their private information may be detected by market 
                                                 
17
 This commitment requires that the traders using dealers’ block trades cannot trade the stock 
again in the near future. 
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makers or revealed by other informed traders, prior to establishing desirable 
positions. Consistent with this “stealth trading” hypothesis, Barclay and Warner 
(1993) find that during the preannouncement periods for tender offer targets 
medium-size trades drive a disproportionally large amount of the cumulative 
stock-price changes relative to their transaction number and volume. 
Furthermore, Chakravarty (2001) uses the TORQ Database and finds that the 
medium trades that have large price impacts are primarily initiated by institutions.  
However, these studies’ evidence only provides indirect support for the 
hypothesis that investors using medium-size trades are informed, since their 
conclusions are based on the assumption that cumulative stock-price movements 
are largely due to informed trading. Although several papers have documented 
that trading on private information, rather than public information, is largely 
driving cumulative stock-price changes (see French and Roll (1986), Barclay, 
Litzenberger, and Warner (1990)), there is no guarantee that the private 
information is correct, i.e., that investors trading on private information are indeed 
informed. Those results could also be due to the overconfidence of medium-size 
traders who pay too much attention on their private information, which may not 
be correct, and trade excessively on it18. To address this concern, this paper 
compares the direction of order flow imbalance across different trade-size groups 
                                                 
18
 Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) propose a theory where investors are 
overconfident about the precision of their private information and the bias leads to long-term 
return reversal and excessive stock volatility.  
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with the direction of actual news19. If investors are informed, they should trade in 
the same direction of the news prior to its announcement.  
The news source used here is the set of analysts’ annual earnings 
forecast announcements. There are several advantages of doing so.  First, the 
public generally does not know the timing of forecast announcement beforehand. 
For the news with pre-announced release date, like earnings announcements, it 
is hard to differentiate the trades from “informed” traders, who know the nature of 
the news, and from “skillful” traders, who correctly bet on the direction of the 
news prior to its release based on their own judgment and publicly available 
information. In contrast, the “correct” trades placed right before forecast 
announcements are more likely to come from informed traders, because those 
investors have to know not only the nature of the news but also its timing, and 
the latter is very difficult to gauge. Second, our samples are more representative. 
Compared to other news whose timing is unknown to the public in advance, like 
tender offers, analysts’ forecast announcements are more frequent and more 
pervasive across different types of firms. Third, sell-side analysts’ information is 
prone to leakage. For example, a recent article from Wall Street Journal20 reveals 
that Goldman Sachs research analysts disseminated their trading tips to their 
own traders first, and then to their top-priority clients before finally making them 
                                                 
19
 Similar approach has been used in several other papers. For example, Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and 
Titman (2008) use it to examine whether investors are informed prior to earnings announcement. 
However, their focus is on trades from individual investors, rather than trades across different 
trade-size groups. 
20
 See “Goldman’s Trading Tips Reward its Biggest Clients” from Wall Street Journal Page A1 on 
August 24, 2009. 
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public. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine order flow imbalance 
surrounding analysts’ earnings forecast announcements. 
Prior to the announcement of earnings forecasts, there could exist two 
types of informed traders. The first type (Type-I) informed traders know the 
nature of earnings forecasts, and should be buyers (sellers) prior to the 
announcements of positive (negative) forecast revisions. The second type (Type-
II) informed traders know the long-term value of the stock, and will react after the 
forecast announcements. For example, assuming an investor is informed about 
the actual earnings the analyst is forecasting, rather than the analyst’s 
forthcoming forecast, she can always compare the analyst’s forecast (once it is 
made to the public) with her private information and determine whether the 
forecast is too optimistic or pessimistic. If the overly optimistic (pessimistic) 
forecasts induce significant market reaction, she will sell (buy) after the forecasts. 
Empirically, for each stock, we examine the abnormal order flow imbalance of 
different trade-size groups to determine whether a certain trade-size group is net 
buyer or net seller for this stock. Suggesting the existence of Type-I informed 
traders and their preference to use medium trades, we find that medium-size 
traders tend to be net buyers prior to very positive forecast revisions and net 
sellers prior to very negative forecast revisions. But we cannot observe such 
pattern for large-size or small-size traders. This result provides strong support for 
the “stealth trading” hypothesis.  We also find that during the announcement all 
trade-size groups are trading in the direction of the news. However, after the 
announcement, large traders keep trading in the direction of the news (“news 
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momentum traders”), whereas medium and small traders are trading against the 
direction of news (“news contrarian traders”)  
In support of the existence of Type-II informed traders and their 
preference to use medium trades, our results show that the stocks medium-size 
traders buy immediately after the forecast announcements significantly 
outperform the stocks they sell in the future up to four months. We also find 
similar patterns for small traders, but only following downward revisions. 
Moreover, we find that large trades placed immediately following the forecasts 
are unprofitable and generate, on average, slightly negative profits in the long 
run. Specifically, the post-event trade imbalance of large trades is weakly 
negatively related to future long-run returns. This result suggests that large 
trades are more likely to be used to meet immediate liquidity needs where the 
execution speed of the trade is more important than the profitability of the trade. 
We also show that our results hold for two different trade-size classification 
methods: a method based on static dollar-based cutoff points and a method 
based on firm-size- and stock-price-specific cutoff points. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides 
further support for the “stealth trading hypothesis” proposed by Barclay and 
Warner (1993), who argue that informed investors prefer to use medium-size 
trades. Our empirical framework allows us to directly test whether the private 
information possessed by medium-size traders is correlated with future public 
information. While existing literature on “stealth trading hypothesis” (Barclay and 
Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001)) exclusively focus on pre-event trading 
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activities, we also examine post-event trading activities and address the question 
of whether medium-size traders have superior skills in interpreting public signals. 
Furthermore, by focusing on analysts’ forecast announcements, we are able to 
differentiate informed investors from skillful speculators while maintaining a 
broader sample. Second, this study provides additional empirical evidence that 
certain investors possess analysts’ information before it is made available to the 
public. Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2009) document that stocks tend to 
experience abnormally high levels of short-selling activity in the three days prior 
to announcements of analysts’ downgrades. While Christophe, et al. (2009) only 
examine short sellers and their trading activities prior to analysts’ downgrades, 
this paper looks at the order flow imbalance induced by all investors and both 
positive and negative news as reflected in earnings forecast announcements. 
Third, this paper extends the studies examining order flow imbalance and its 
implications. Some of these studies investigate trade imbalance’s effects on 
cross-sectional returns (See Hvidkjaer (2006, 2008), Barber and Odean (2008), 
Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009), Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2009), etc.), while 
some of them examine its relation to earnings announcements (See 
Bhattacharya (2001), Battalio and Mendenhall (2005), Shanthikumar (2004), 
Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman (2008), Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz 
(2009), etc.). These studies either focus on the large or small trades, which are 
used as proxies for institutional or individual trades, or look directly at the 
institutional or individual trades. However, medium-size trades are usually 
omitted from their analysis, since it is difficult to separate these trades into 
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institutional and retail trades. Our results suggest that medium-size trades, which 
could be initiated by either individuals or institutions, contain very important 
information about forthcoming public announcements and future long-run stock 
returns.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data 
and the construction of the order flow imbalance variables. Section III analyses 
the trading imbalance of different trade-size groups before, during, and after the 
announcement of analysts’ forecasts, and examine the relation between the 
trading imbalance and the nature of the news. Section IV investigates the 
predictive power of order flow imbalance from different trade-size groups for 
future long-run returns. We check our results’ robustness to an alternative trade-
size classification scheme in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 Data and Construction of Variables 
2.2.1 Sample Selection 
 
 The sample in this paper includes all ordinary common stocks listed on 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
during the period from January 1994 to December 2000. We exclude NASDAQ 
stocks, because their trading volumes are partially double-counted and thus are 
not comparable with NYSE and AMEX. The sample period begins at 1994 when 
the forecast announcement dates recorded in I/B/ES start to become reliable, as 
suggested by Clement and Tse (2003). Similar to Barber, Odean, and Zhu 
(2009), the sample period stops at 2000, because the introduction of 
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decimalization in 2000 and the widespread use of computerized algorithm trading 
to break up institutional trades create a structural change in the distribution of 
trade sizes21. Therefore, the trade size cutoff points, suggested by earlier studies, 
may no longer be valid after 2000.  
 Analysts’ forecast information is obtained from the Institutional Broker 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Detailed History database22. The forecasts are for 
firms’ current fiscal year-end earnings. To insure that the analysts’ forecast 
announcements are not contaminated by other concurrent events, we require 
that there is no quarterly/annual earnings announcement made 10 days prior to 
or after the forecasts, and there is no other forecast announcement made 5 days 
prior to or after the forecasts. We also require that forecasts must be made at 
least 30 days, but no more than 1 year, before the fiscal-year end. The forecast-
horizon requirement of at least 30 days is needed, since Clement and Tse (2003) 
show that the market tends to be less responsive to late forecasts, i.e., those 
made closer to the fiscal-year end, and thus informed traders may not find it 
profitable to trade before the late forecasts. The forecast-horizon requirement of 
less than 1 year excludes stale forecasts. 
 Stock transaction data are obtained from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) 
database. Only NYSE/AMEX quotes and trades reported within the opening 
hours (from 9:30AM to 4PM) of the exchanges are included. We also eliminate 
                                                 
21
 For example, Hvidkjaer (2008) has found that there is a huge increase in the number of small 
trades after 2000. 
22
 The rounding error problem associated with I/B/E/S adjusted data (Barber and Kang (2002)) is 
less severe in the case of the detailed history I/B/E/S database, where the estimates are rounded 
to four decimals, instead of two decimals as is the case in the summary history I/B/E/S database. 
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the opening trades, which are aggregated orders from a call auction process for 
NYSE/AMEX stocks. The trades and quotes data are run through a filter, 
suggested by Hvidkjaer (2006), to exclude erroneous observations. Specifically, 
we exclude quote observations with condition codes of “4, 5, 7-9, 11, 13-17, 19, 
20” and trade observations with condition codes of “A, C, D, G, L, N, O, R, X, Z, 
8, 9”. In addition, quotes are deleted if the ask price is not greater than the bid 
price, or the bid-ask spread is greater than 75% of the quote midpoint, or the 
ask/bid price is more than double or less than half of the previous ask/bid price. 
Trades are deleted if the correction code is greater than 1, or the trade price is 
more than double of less than half of the previous trade price. Following Lee and 
Ready (1991), the trade report times are lagged by five seconds when we merge 
trade and quote data, and the trades are classified into buyer- or seller-initiated 
trades by using the quote rule first and then the tick rule. In particular, the trade is 
buyer (seller) initiated, if the trade price is above (below) the midpoint of the most 
recent quotes. If the trade price equals the quote midpoint, we use the tick rule, 
i.e., the trade is buyer (seller) initiated, when the trade price is above (below) the 
previous trade price.  
Finally, we require that stocks simultaneously have trade information from 
TAQ, prices information from CRSP, and accounting information from Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual Files during the periods surrounding forecast 
announcements. After all the requirements, we have 28409 valid analyst-forecast 
observations and on average about 338 observations per month. In addition, our 
sample covers about 276 different firms every month. 
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2.2.2 The Trade-size Classification and Order Flow Imbalance Measure 
 Following Lee and Radhkrishna (2000) and Barber, et al. (2009), we 
partition the trades into three trade-size groups based on the dollar size (T) of the 
trades: 
1. T <= $5,000 (Small Trades) 
2. $5,000 < T <= $50,000 (Medium Trades) 
3. T > $50,000 (Large Trades) 
Dollar-based cutoff points are more accurate than share-based ones, 
since the latter are likely to be biased when the stock price per share is unusually 
high or low. For example, the share-based approach used in Barclay and Werner 
(1993) and Chakravarty (2001) classifies all the trades with more than 10,000 
shares as large trades. However, for “penny” stocks, 10,000 shares could hardly 
be considered as large trades. Lee and Radhkrishna (2000), using TORQ data, 
find that these cutoff points perform very well in differentiating individual trades 
from institutional trades, i.e., small trades are more likely to come from 
individuals while large trades are more likely to come from institutions. Although 
there is still an ongoing debate on the suitability of this proxy23, it should have 
little impact on our study. This paper focuses on investigating which trade size 
the informed investors prefer to use, regardless of the informed traders’ 
characteristics (e.g., institutions or individuals). This classification scheme is 
adopted, because it provides an objective way to separate the trades based on 
their economic significance. The cutoff points are proposed based on the TORQ 
                                                 
23
 For example, Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2007) conclude that the smallest trades 
(below $2000) are actually more likely to come from institutions rather than individuals. 
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data covering the period from November 1990 to January 1991. To account for 
the inflation effect on trade sizes, all the trades’ dollar sizes are converted to 
1991 dollars using annual CPI level before comparing them to the cutoff points. 
In response to possible concerns regarding the appropriateness of our trade-size 
classification method, in Section V we will repeat our analysis using an 
alternative trade-size classification method in which cutoff points are specific to 
firm size and stock prices. We show that our results are quite robust to different 
trade-size classification methods. 
To detect investors’ unusual trading activities, we use cumulative 
abnormal order flow imbalance. For each stock i on day t, the daily abnormal 
order flow imbalance (ABN_DOFI) for trade-size group j is defined as:  
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Here, Buy (Sell) is the daily dollar volume of buyer- (seller-) initiated 
trades. Daily order flow imbalance is subtracted by the average daily imbalance 
in the prior year to get the abnormal measure. And the cumulative abnormal 
order flow (ABN_OFI) over the period from t1 to t2 is defined as: 
∑
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Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of this measure. It is shown that 
large traders are, on average, net buyers before [t-5, t-2], during [t-1, t+1], and 
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after the forecast announcements [t+2, t+5]. The evidence is inconclusive for 
medium and small traders, since the sign of means and medians are 
inconsistent. 
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Table 2.1 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Variables  Definition 
Abnormal Order Flow 
Imbalance of Large/ 
Medium/ Small Trades 
ABN_OFILarge/Med/Small, t1, 
t2 
It is the cumulative abnormal order flow imbalance 
(OFI) during the period from relative trading day t1 
to t2 for the trades on a stock that belongs to certain 
size group.  
 
E.g., large trades are defined as the trades with size 
greater than $50,000 (in terms of 1991 dollars); 
medium trades are the trades with size between 
$5,000 and $50,000; small trades are the trades 
with size below $5,000. 
 
The daily abnormal OFI on day t is calculated as: 
yearpriortheintt
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tt
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where buyt (sellt) is dollar volume of all buyer (seller) 
initiated trades on day t. And the cumulative 
abnormal OFI from t1 to t2 is defined as: 
∑
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tt
ttt DOFIABOFIAB  
 
Mean Abnormal Order 
Flow Imbalance of Size-
B/M-sorted Benchmark 
Portfolio 
MABN_OFILarge/Med/Small, 
t1, t2 
It is the cumulative daily averages of abnormal OFIs 
for all the stocks in the same size-B/M-sorted 
benchmark portfolio from relative trading day t1 to 
t2.   
 
Every July, we sort all the stocks that have OFI 
information from TAQ database into size quintiles 
based on the market value of equity at the end of 
June. Within each size quintile, we further sort the 
stocks into B/M quintiles. The Book-to-market ratio 
is the book value of common equity at the end of 
fiscal year ending anywhere in the previous 
calendar year divided by the market value of equity 
at the end of previous calendar year. The 
benchmark portfolio is equally weighted. 
 
Short-term Cummulative 
Abnormal Return 
CAR t1,t2 It is the cumulative market-adjusted return during 
the periods surrounding analyst’s forecast 
announcement date. The measurement period 
starts on relative trading day t1 and ends on t2. The 
market adjusted return is calculated by subtracting 
the concurrent value-weighted market return from 
the firm j’s daily stock return. 
 
Long-term Post-event 
Cumulative DGTW 
Characteristic-adjusted 
Abnormal Returns 
LTCAR_DGTWt1,t2 
∑
=
−=
2
1
_ )(_
t
tt
benchdgtw
tit RRDGTWLTCAR , 
where  itR  is the raw daily return and
benchdgtw
tR
_
 is 
the daily return on size-B/M-momentum sorted 
benchmark portfolio. The universe for benchmark 
portfolios include all stocks listed in NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ. 
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Long-term Post-event 
Cumulative Size-B/M-
adjusted Abnormal 
Returns 
LTCAR_SBMt1,t2 
∑
=
−=
2
1
_
2,1 )(_
t
tt
benchsbm
tittt RRSBMLTCAR , 
where  itR  is the raw daily return and
benchsbm
tR
_
 is 
the daily return on size-B/M sorted benchmark 
portfolio. The universe for benchmark portfolios 
include all stocks listed in NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. 
 
Long-term Post-event 
Cumulative DGTW 
Characteristic-adjusted 
Abnormal Returns 
(With NYSE-and-AMEX 
Benchmark Universe)  
LTCAR_DGTW_NAt1,t2 The construction of this variable is similar to 
LTCAR_DGTWt1,t2 , except that the universe for 
benchmark portfolios include only stocks listed in 
NYSE and AMEX. 
 
Forecast Revision FCST_REV It is the EPS forecast minus the prior EPS forecast 
from the same analyst, scaled by the stock closing 
price two days prior to the analyst’s forecast 
announcement date. 
 
Pre-event Momentum MOMEN It is the six-month cumulative return during the 
period ending six trading days before the forecast 
announcement (t-6). 
 
Forecast Innovation 
Signal 
INNOV_SIG Following Gleason and Lee (2003), it equals to 1 
(highly-innovative good-news forecasts), if the 
forecast is above the prior consensus and analyst’s 
own prior forecast; equals to 0 (low-innovative 
forecasts), if the forecast falls between the prior 
consensus and analyst’s own prior forecast; equals 
to -1 (highly-innovative bad-news), if the forecast is 
below the prior consensus and analyst’s own prior 
forecast. 
 
The prior consensus is the mean of forecasts for the 
same firm in the previous month obtained from 
I/B/E/S summary database. 
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Here we report the descriptive statistics of the main variables at the forecast level. The sample 
consists of the analysts’ forecasts for current fiscal year-end earnings announced between 1994 
and 2000 and documented in I/B/E/S Adjusted Detail History Database. We require that forecasts 
must be made at least 30 days, but no more than 1 year, before the fiscal-year end. We also 
eliminate the forecasts that have a quarterly/annual earnings announced during the period of t-10 
to t+10, or have other earnings forecasts announced during the period of t-5 to t+5. The stocks 
covered by the analysts are required to be traded in NYSE/AMEX and have available trade and 
quote information in TAQ database during the sample period. All the variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom one percentile. Table I has the definition of all variables. 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
25
th
 
percentil
e 
Median 
75
th
 
percentil
e 
ABN_OFILarge, t-5, t-2 27993 0.0428 2.2289 -1.3269 0.0730 1.4114 
ABN_OFILarge, t-1, t+1 28003 0.0326 1.8941 -1.1238 0.0521 1.2117 
ABN_OFILarge, t+2, t+5 28006 0.0188 2.2137 -1.3556 0.0470 1.4263 
ABN_OFIMed, t-5, t-2 27993 0.0080 1.6093 -0.9088 0.0299 0.9606 
ABN_OFIMed, t-1, t+1 28003 -0.0188 1.3467 -0.7779 0.0090 0.7673 
ABN_OFIMed, t+2, t+5 28006 -0.0160 1.6195 -0.9523 0.0144 0.9426 
ABN_OFIsmall, t-5, t-2 27993 -0.0093 2.0681 -1.2268 0.0000 1.2502 
ABN_OFIsmall, t-1, t+1 28003 -0.0185 1.6555 -1.0169 0.0000 1.0095 
ABN_OFIsmall, t+2, t+5 28006 -0.0520 2.0702 -1.2780 0.0000 1.2191 
MABN_OFILarge, t-5, t-2 26825 0.0219 0.3717 -0.2157 0.0346 0.2749 
MABN_OFILarge, t-1, t+1 26836 0.0105 0.3083 -0.1853 0.0184 0.2181 
MABN_OFILarge, t+2,t+5 26836 0.0158 0.3730 -0.2236 0.0272 0.2653 
MABN_OFIMed, t-5, t-2 26825 -0.0167 0.3855 -0.2419 0.0101 0.2450 
MABN_OFIMed, t-1, t+1 26836 -0.0225 0.3147 -0.2085 -0.0025 0.1891 
MABN_OFIMed, t+2, t+5 26836 -0.0301 0.3872 -0.2575 -0.0079 0.2349 
MABN_OFIsmall, t-5, t-2 26825 -0.0424 0.4189 -0.3102 -0.0243 0.2401 
MABN_OFIsmall, t-1, t+1 26836 -0.0395 0.3316 -0.2558 -0.0235 0.1833 
MABN_OFIsmall, t+2, t+5 26836 -0.0576 0.4191 -0.3257 -0.0360 0.2278 
CAR t-5, t-2 (%) 28409 -0.0992 3.8626 -2.1214 -0.2220 1.8004 
CAR t-1, t+1 (%) 28409 -0.2140 6.4958 -3.7924 -0.4281 3.1926 
CAR t+2, t+5 (%) 28409 -0.2317 6.4986 -3.8204 -0.4622 3.0814 
MOMEN (%) 26842 7.5376 27.3527 -8.9677 5.6819 20.5895 
FCST_REV 28409 -0.0025 0.0121 -0.0026 -0.0001 0.0011 
INNOV_SIG 26145 -0.0568 0.8540 -1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
LTCAR_SBMt+6, t+20 (%) 26922 -0.2131 8.6170 -4.8963 -0.3552 4.4140 
LTCAR_SBMt+6, t+120 (%) 26922 -1.2792 23.9596 -14.8017 -1.3674 11.8968 
LTCAR_SBMt+6, t+250 (%) 26922 -1.1264 35.6760 -21.2170 -2.0647 18.1661 
LTCAR_DTGWt+6, t+20 (%) 26922 -0.1754 8.4455 -4.8165 -0.3291 4.3263 
LTCAR_DTGWt+6, t+120 (%) 26922 -1.0104 23.3865 -13.9985 -1.0681 11.7000 
LTCAR_DTGWt+6, t+250 (%) 26922 -0.8505 34.4889 -20.1125 -1.7943 17.2726 
LTCAR_DTGW_NAt+6, t+20 (%) 26916 -0.0768 8.1872 -4.5549 -0.1414 4.3433 
LTCAR_DTGW_NAt+6, t+120 (%) 26916 -0.1754 22.1967 -12.7672 -0.3672 11.9906 
LTCAR_DTGW_NAt+6, t+250 (%) 26916 0.8515 32.7871 -18.0684 -0.3912 17.9683 
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2.3 The Trade Imbalance Surrounding Forecast Announcements 
2.3.1 Univariate Analysis 
 In this section, we examine which trade-size group is informed about the 
forthcoming forecast announcement. To do this, we report the average 
cumulative order flow imbalances of the three trade-size groups (large, medium, 
and small), conditional on the nature of the forecasts. We classify forecasts into 
five news groups based on the cumulative abnormal returns (STCAR) during the 
three-day surrounding the forecast announcement [t-1, t+1],: very positive 
(STCAR > 5%), positive (1% < STCAR <= 5%), neutral (-1% < STCAR <= 1%), 
negative (-5% < STCAR <= -1%), and very negative news (STCAR < -5%). The 
daily abnormal returns are calculated as the raw daily returns less the concurrent 
value-weighted market returns. 
 From Table 2.3 Panel A, we can see that during the pre-event period 
order flow imbalances induced by large and small traders are not systematically 
related to the nature of forthcoming forecasts, suggesting that they are 
uninformed. In contrast, medium traders seem to know the nature of forecasts in 
advance; they are net buyers (positive ABN_OFI) for very positive news and net 
sellers (negative ABN_OFI) for very negative news. To account for the possibility 
that ABN_OFI may not be normally distributed, which may invalidate the t-test, 
we also report the medians and test the median difference by non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. It is shown that the medium traders’ pre-event ABN_OFI 
difference between very positive and very negative news is 12.27% and 
statistically significant both in terms of the mean and median. Since the timing of 
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analysts’ forecast announcement is unknown to the public, this result suggests 
that certain medium traders know not only the nature of the forecast but also the 
timing of the forecast. Moreover, it is unlikely that medium traders may just be 
skillful in guessing the direction of the forecast revisions. 
 Panel B of Table 2.3 shows that during the event period order flow 
imbalances across all three trade-size groups are monotonically increasing with 
the event-period CARs. However, since both order flow imbalances and CARs 
are measured over the period of [t-1, t+1], it is hard to infer the causal direction of 
this pattern. It is possible that positive (negative) news induce buying (selling) 
pressure, while it is also likely that buying (selling) pressure itself tends to drive 
up (down) concurrent stock returns. 
 In Panel C of Table 2.3, we look at the order flow imbalance during the 
four days immediately following the announcement of forecasts. Interestingly, we 
find that large traders tend to be “news momentum” traders, who are buying after 
good news and selling after bad news. On the other hand, medium and small 
traders tend to be “news contrarian” traders, who are selling winners and buying 
losers. These results are similar to the findings from earnings announcements. 
For example, Shanthikumar (2004) find large traders trade in the direction of 
earnings surprises for up to one month after the announcement while small 
traders do not. Kaniel, et al. (2008), who are able to identify individuals’ trades 
using the proprietary Consolidated Audit Trail database, also document a 
contrarian behavior for individual investors following earnings surprises.  
 60 
Table 2.3 
Order Flow Imbalances during Periods Surrounding Forecast Announcements 
 
The reported are means and medians of the cumulative abnormal OFI of different trade-size 
groups across various news groups. We sort the forecasts into five news groups, based on the 
market response during the announcement date. In particular, the forecast is “very-positive” 
news, if CARt-1, t+1 >= 5%; the forecast is “positive” news, if 1%<= CARt-1, t+1 < 5%; the forecast is 
”neutral” news, if -1% <= CARt-1, t+1 < 1%; the forecast is “negative” news, if -5% <= CARt-1, t+1 < -
1%; the forecast is “very-negative” news, if CARt-1, t+1 <= -5%. Variables are defined in Table I. To 
test the difference in means, we use two-sided T-test and T-statistics are reported in brackets. To 
test the difference in medians, we use two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test and the corresponding 
p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 
1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Pre-event Period (t-5, t-2) 
   News Nature  
   Very 
Negative 
(VN) 
Negative Neutral Positive Very 
Positive 
(VP) 
VP-VN 
[t-stat]  or 
(Wilcoxon 
P-value) 
 nobs 2194 8571 7861 7142 2225 
 
 
Large Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean 0.0147 0.0731 0.0503 0.014 0.0249 0.0102 
[0.15] 
 median 0.0321 0.088 0.0845 0.0596 0.0787 0.0466 
(0.8298) 
Medium Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean -0.0487 0.0015 0.0024 0.0187 0.074 0.1227** 
[2.51] 
 median 0.0015 0.0232 0.0343 0.0396 0.0421 0.0406** 
(0.0204) 
Small Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean 0.0173 -0.0252 -0.0436 -0.0018 0.1186 0.1013* 
[1.67] 
 median 0.0213 0 0 0 0.1427 0.1214 
(0.1194) 
        
Panel B. During-event Period (t-1, t+1) 
   News Nature  
   Very 
Negative 
(VN) 
Negative Neutral Positive Very 
Positive 
(VP) 
VP-VN 
[t-stat]  or 
(Wilcoxon 
P-value) 
 nobs 2196 8577 7863 7142 2225 
 
 
Large Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean -0.7441 -0.4312 0.0625 0.5351 0.8792 1.6232*** 
[30] 
 median -0.715 -0.3338 0.0531 0.4926 0.8208 1.5358*** 
(<.0001) 
Medium Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean -0.4041 -0.2441 -0.0264 0.2228 0.4847 0.8889*** 
[22.48] 
 median -0.3034 -0.1833 0.0133 0.1942 0.4163 0.7197*** 
(<.0001) 
Small Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean -0.1329 -0.1197 -0.0813 0.0809 0.3881 0.5211*** 
[11.06] 
 median -0.0828 -0.0478 0 0.0099 0.3746 0.4574*** 
(<.0001) 
 61 
 
Panel C. Post-event Period (t+2, t+5) 
   News Nature  
   
Very 
Negative 
(VN) 
Negative Neutral Positive 
Very 
Positive 
(VP) 
VP-VN 
[t-stat]  or 
(Wilcoxon 
P-value) 
 nobs 2195 8575 7867 7142 2227 
 
 
Large Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean -0.278 -0.1458 0.0062 0.2222 0.3414 0.6193*** 
[9.49] 
 median -0.186 -0.0811 0.0491 0.2049 0.3383 0.5243*** 
(<.0001) 
Medium Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean 0.1897 0.0358 -0.0746 -0.0567 -0.083 -0.2726*** 
[-5.8] 
 median 0.1955 0.0558 -0.0279 -0.0111 -0.0743 -0.2698*** 
(<.0001) 
Small Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean 0.1847 -0.0722 -0.117 -0.0495 0.0284 -0.1563*** 
[-2.59] 
 median 0.1744 0 0 0 0.048 -0.1264** 
(0.0168) 
        
 
2.3.2 Regression Analysis 
 The results of pre-event trade imbalance are of greater interests to us, 
since they provide direct support to the stealth trading hypothesis. This section 
employs a regression framework that enables us to control for other variables 
that may also affect trade imbalances. The pre-event cumulative order flow 
imbalance of the trade-size group j for stock i is modeled as: 
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 The stealth trading hypothesis predicts that medium traders are informed 
about the nature of upcoming  forecasts, i.e., event-period market response CAR 
i, t-1, t+1 should be positively related to pre-event trade imbalance ABN_OFI i, j, t-5, t-2 
for only medium-size trade group. Since pre-event trade imbalance could also be 
trigged by other news that is announced over the period of [t-5, t-2] and not 
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captured by our sample selection filter24, we control for this potential bias by 
including the pre-event market response CAR i, t-5, t-2. If any pre-event news is 
significant enough to trigger trade imbalance, it must also have similar effect on 
concurrent stock returns. We also control for the stock return momentum, which 
is measured as the past 6-month stock return up to day t-6. Hvidkjaer (2006) 
finds that small traders tend to buy past 6-month losers and reduce the purchase 
of past 6-month winners, whereas large traders are largely momentum traders 
who buy past winners and sell past losers. It is also possible that there exists 
cross-sectional dependence in order flow imbalances for stocks with similar 
characteristics. For example, if investors engage in style investing as suggested 
by Barberis and Shleifer (2003), then on a certain day all stocks in one asset 
class, e.g. small-value stocks, may experience the same buying or selling 
pressure. These buying or selling pressures are not due to investors’ trading on 
firm-specific information and thus need to be controlled for. To achieve this goal, 
we include the contemporaneous order flow imbalance of an equally-weighted 
benchmark portfolio. The benchmark portfolio for a stock I includes all the stocks 
in NYSE/AMEX that are in the same size and book-to-market bin as stock i.25  
 Table 2.4 reports the coefficient estimates of model (1) for each trade-size 
group. To further account for the cross-sectional dependency in the dependent 
variable, we use the Rogers standard errors that are clustered by month, as 
                                                 
24
 Our sample selection procedure has eliminated the possibility that earnings or analysts’ 
forecast announcements can be made during that period. 
25 Specifically, at the beginning of each July we sort the stocks into five size groups based on 
size-quintile cutoff points obtained from NYSE stocks only. The size is measured as the market 
capitalization at the end of June. Within each size group, we further sort the stocks into B/M 
quintiles based on their industry-adjusted book-to-market ratios.  
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suggested by Petersen (2009). Consistent with the stealth trading hypothesis, 
only medium-size trade imbalances are positively related to event-period market 
responses. Based on the regression estimation, a 10% increase in event-period 
CAR i, t-1, t+1 is associated with an 8% increase in pre-event net buying pressure 
from medium traders ABN_OFI med, t-5, t-2. The signs of the control variables’ 
coefficients are also largely as expected. The pre-event order flow imbalance is 
significantly positively related to the pre-event CAR and the order flow imbalance 
of the benchmark portfolio. Similar to the findings of Hvidkjaer (2006), the 
negative sign of 3β  for small traders suggest that they are contrarians who trade 
in the opposite direction of the past six-month price movement, while the positive 
sign of 
3β  for large traders suggest that they are momentum traders. 
Interestingly, medium traders display a similar contrarian trading pattern as the 
small traders during the post-event period. In addition, we find that individual 
stocks’ trade imbalance is positively related to the trade imbalance of benchmark 
portfolios, suggesting that stocks with similar characteristics tend to experience 
the same buying or selling pressures during certain periods. 
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Table 2.4 
Regression Analysis of Abnormal Order Flow Imbalances during the Pre-event Period 
 
This table reports the regression results of the cumulative abnormal OFIs of different trade size 
during the pre-event period [t-5, t-2] on various variables. Variables are defined in Table I. The 
regressions are the pooled OLS regression where the standard errors are clustered by month. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, 
and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variables: 
 Large Trades 
ABN_OFILarge, t-5, t-2 
Medium Trades 
ABN_OFIMed, t-5, t-2 
Small 
ABN_OFIsmall, t-5, t-2 
Intercept 0.0611** 0.0279* 0.0132 0.00951 -.0075 0.0573*** 
 (2.6) (1.79) (0.52) (0.46) (-0.24) (4.41) 
CARt-1, t+1 0.0010 -.0017 0.0081*** 0.0068** 0.0063 0.0056 
 (0.32) (-0.48) (2.82) (2.39) (1.54) (1.58) 
CARt-5, t-2 0.07971*** 0.0761*** 0.0198*** 0.0187*** 0.0068** 0.0068*** 
 (21.21) (20.39) (11.81) (10.67) (2.48) (2.9) 
MOMEN  0.0015**  -.0011**  -.0031*** 
  (2.59)  (-2.41)  (-5.04) 
MABN_OFILarge, t-5, t-2  0.9045***     
  (22.79)     
MABN_OFIMed, t-5, t-2    0.4470***   
    (9.43)   
MABN_OFIsmall, t-5, t-2      0.99521*** 
      (28.53) 
Num of Observations 27993 26476 27993 26476 27993 26476 
Adjusted R-square 5.46% 7.85% 0.68% 1.77% 0.053% 4.41% 
 
2.4 Post-event Trade Imbalance and Future Long-run Stock Performance 
 In this section, we investigate whether there exist Type-II informed traders 
who know the long-term value of the stocks and whether they will use medium 
trades to exploit their informational advantage. For Type-II informed traders, their 
trades after observing the public signals should be consistent with the stock long-
run performance. Thus, we focus on the relation between order flow imbalance 
immediately following the forecast announcement [t+2, t+5] and stock long-run 
cumulative abnormal returns over the period of [t+6, t+T]. 
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2.4.1 Long-run Abnormal Return Measure 
  To measure long-run abnormal returns, we use cumulative size-B/M-
adjusted returns and cumulative DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns 
proposed by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). As pointed out by 
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), cumulative abnormal returns have better 
statistical properties and are less subject to the positive skewness bias which 
could yield mispecified t statistics, compared to buy-and-hold abnormal returns.  
In particular, at the beginning of each July we sort all the stocks in NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ into 25 size-B/M benchmark portfolios for size-B/M-
adjusted returns and 125 size-B/M-momentum benchmark portfolios for 
characteristics-adjusted returns. For example, the 125 size-B/M-momentum 
benchmark portfolios are formed by sequentially sorting stocks into size, book-to-
market ratio, and momentum quintiles. The size is the stock’s market 
capitalization at the end of June and the breakpoints used for the size sorting are 
the size-quintile breakpoints of NYSE firms only. The book-to-market ratio is the 
ratio of book value of common equity at the end of fiscal year ending anywhere in 
the previous calendar year and the market capitalization at the end of last 
December. We further adjust the ratio by subtracting the long-term industry26 
average. Finally, the momentum is the past 12-month return excluding the most 
recent one month, i.e., it is measured from last July to the end of this May. 
 Since our sample selection criteria limit the universe to NYSE/AMEX 
stocks, we also re-estimate the DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns using 
                                                 
26
 Industries are defined following Fama-French 48-industry classification. 
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only NYSE/AMEX stocks for the benchmark portfolios. The long-run cumulative 
abnormal return is the sum of daily differences of raw return and the 
contemporaneous return on the corresponding benchmark portfolio. Specifically, 
for stock i over the period of [t1, t2], its cumulative abnormal return is calculated 
as: 
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In Table V, we compare the appropriateness of the above three measures 
of long-run cumulative abnormal return by examining the post-forecast-
announcement drift. Several papers have documented that stock prices tend to 
drift in the same direction of forecast revisions for up to nine months (e.g., Stickel 
(1991), Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lackonishok (1996), and Gleason and Lee 
(2003)). The forecast revision is measured as the difference between an 
analyst’s current forecast and his/her own prior forecast, scaled by the stock 
closing price two days prior to the forecast announcement27.  
As shown in Table 2.5, under all the three CAR measures, stocks 
experiencing negative revisions continue to underperform relative to stocks 
experiencing positive revisions for up to one year, and the drift is more 
pronounced during the first six months following forecast revisions. It is also 
shown that different measures do generate different levels of CARs. The drift 
magnitude measured by DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns is smaller than 
                                                 
27
 Stickel (1991), Imhoff and Lobo (1984) and Gleason and Lee (2003) all find that analyst’s own 
prior forecast is a better benchmark than the prior consensus forecast for measuring the amount 
of surprise in analysts’ forecasts. 
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the one measured by size-B/M-adjusted returns. This is not surprising, given the 
prior finding that the post-forecast-announcement drift can be partially explained 
by the momentum effect (Chan, et al.(1996)). Although the use of characteristics-
adjusted returns may potentially weaken our results, it is preferred to size-B/M-
adjusted returns, as it is a more conservative approach and since we know that 
findings based on this measure are not artifacts of the momentum effect. We also 
find that the CAR measures using the full universe (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) are 
systematically biased downward. For example, the medians of long-run CAR for 
positive-revision stocks tend to be negative. This is likely due to the fact that 
NASDAQ stocks are performing fairly well during our sample period (1994-2000) 
which coincides with the technology-bubble period. More specifically, our sample 
filter eliminates NASDAQ stocks but our benchmark portfolios include these 
stocks. Consequently, the returns on the benchmark portfolios will be, on 
average, higher than the raw returns on our sample stocks, which yields 
downwardly biased CAR. Panel C of Table V confirms this argument. Here, the 
benchmark portfolios consist of only NYSE and AMEX stocks, and the mean and 
median values of this CAR measure (LTCAR_DGTW_NA) remain positive for 
stocks following positive revisions. Also, from Table II we can see that 
LTCAR_DGTW_NA is on average higher than LTCAR_DGTW that includes 
NASDAQ stocks in the benchmark universe. For the rest of the analysis, we will 
use LTCAR_DGTW_NA as the long-run abnormal return measure, since results 
based on it will not affected by our sample selection criteria. However, it should 
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be noted that our results remain qualitatively the same if we use the other two 
CAR measures. 
Table 2.5 
Post-earnings-forecast Long-term CARs 
Sorted by the Signs of Forecast Revisions 
 
The reported are means and medians of the long-term cumulative abnormal returns following 
earnings forecast announcements. We sort the forecasts into two groups, based on the signs of 
forecast revision. Variables are defined in Table I. To test the difference in means, we use two-
sided T-test and T-statistics are reported in brackets. To test the difference in medians, we use 
two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test and the corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Cumulative Size-B/M-adjusted Returns (LTCAR_SBM) 
(Benchmark Universe: NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ) 
   nobs 
 
[t+6, 
t+20] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
Positive Revision 
(FCST_REV >0) 
Mean 12461 0.3672 0.3909 0.1788 0.0629 0.3225 
 Median 
 
 0.1882 0.301 0.1259 -0.276 -0.8023 
Negative Revision 
(FCST_REV <0) 
Mean 13893 -0.7009 -1.4124 -2.0148 -2.3497 -2.2785 
 Median 
 
 -0.8375 -1.364 -2.062 -2.3105 -3.1182 
Difference Mean  1.0680*** 1.8411*** 2.1935*** 2.4126*** 2.6010*** 
 [t-stat] 
 
 [10.06] [11.44] [9.16] [8.18] [5.92] 
 Median  1.0257*** 1.665*** 2.1879*** 2.0345*** 2.3159*** 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Panel B. Cumulative DGTW Characteristics-adjusted Returns (LTCAR_DGTW) 
(Benchmark Universe: NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ) 
   nobs [t+6, 
t+20] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
Positive Revision 
(FCST_REV >0) 
Mean 12461 0.3173 0.2828 0.1237 0.0893 0.3072 
 Median 
 
 0.0954 0.1898 -0.0335 -0.3166 -0.8624 
Negative Revision 
(FCST_REV <0) 
Mean 13893 -0.582 -1.1903 -1.6134 -1.8804 -1.7814 
 Median 
 
 -0.6627 -1.0731 -1.6426 -1.6522 -2.4982 
Difference Mean  0.8993*** 1.4731*** 1.7371*** 1.9697*** 2.0886*** 
 [t-stat] 
 
 [8.64] [9.29] [7.42] [6.84] [4.91] 
 Median  0.7581*** 1.2629*** 1.6091*** 1.3356*** 1.6358*** 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Panel C. Cumulative DGTW Characteristics-adjusted Returns (LTCAR_DGTW_NA) 
(Benchmark Universe: NYSE, AMEX) 
   nobs [t+6, 
t+20] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
Positive Revision 
(FCST_REV >0) 
Mean 12460 0.4284 0.579 0.6761 0.7939 1.6441 
 Median 
 
 0.3138 0.4881 0.4641 0.3405 0.3036 
Negative Revision 
(FCST_REV <0) 
Mean 13888 -0.4952 -0.9053 -0.9222 -1.8804 0.2331 
 Median 
 
 -0.5064 -0.7287 -1.0933 -1.6522 -0.9806 
Difference Mean  0.9236*** 1.4842*** 1.5983*** 1.7592*** 1.4110*** 
 [t-stat] 
 
 [9.16] [9.7] [7.17] [6.43] [3.49] 
 Median  0.8202*** 1.2168*** 1.5574*** 1.9927*** 1.2842*** 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
        
 
2.4.2 Univariate Analysis  
 Table 2.6 reports long-run stock performance after forecast 
announcements over the periods ranging from one month to one year, 
conditional on the level of trade imbalances immediately following the forecasts, 
i.e., from relative trading day t+2 to day t+5. Specifically, every year, for each 
trade-size group we sort stocks into quintiles based on the post-event trade 
imbalance. Consistent with prior evidence, medium traders seem to be also 
informed about the long-term value of the stock and their trades can reliably 
predict future returns up to six months ahead. For example, in Panel B of Table 
VI, the stocks heavily bought by medium traders after the forecasts outperform 
the stocks heavily sold by them by about 1% over the two-month holding period. 
 Interestingly, there is also evidence suggesting that small-size trade 
imbalance can predict future returns (See Panel C of Table VI). Stocks that small 
traders buy outperform the stocks they sell for up to four months following the 
forecasts. Moreover, the magnitude of the performance difference is similar to 
 70 
that generated by sorting on the medium-trade imbalance. It may be because 
that Type-II informed traders face less time constraints and more information 
uncertainty, and thus they use small trade occasionally to trade on their private 
information.  Specifically, compared to Type-I informed traders who have to finish 
their trades prior to the announcement of forecast revisions, Type-II traders can 
exploit their private information about stock long-term value over a much longer 
period, meanwhile they have to take on more risks, in that during this extended 
period it is more likely that certain exogenous news may move the stock prices in 
a direction opposite to their initial expectations. Another interesting result is in 
Panel A of Table VI. Large trades can also predict future returns but in an 
opposite sense, i.e. the stocks large traders buy right after the analysts’ forecasts 
significantly underperforming those they sell during the holding period of two to 
six months. Therefore, large traders will lose money if they hold their positions for 
the long run. Taken together with the evidence in Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) 
that large trades are more likely to come from institutions, our results here 
suggest that large trades are likely used by institutions to meet immediate 
liquidity needs. For example, a mutual fund may use large trades when they 
experience unexpected large amounts of funds inflows or outflows. Under this 
scenario, the large traders’ top priority is execution speed, rather than profits 
generated by these trades28.  
                                                 
28 Another possible explanation to this finding is that lots of large trades are batched trades that 
consist of several smaller orders placed for liquidity purposes. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) find 
that 56% of the trades involving more than 1900 shares have multiple participants on the active-
side. Unfortunately, we cannot tell which trade is batched using the TAQ database. 
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Table 2.6 
Post-earnings-forecast Long-term CARs 
Sorted by the Abnormal OFIs during [t+2, t+5] 
The reported are means and medians of the long-term cumulative abnormal returns following 
earnings forecast announcements. We sort the forecasts into quintiles, based on the cumulative 
abnormal OFIs of different trade sizes measured during the period immediately after the forecast 
announcement [t+2, t+5]. The long-run CAR is measured using DGTW characteristics-adjusted 
returns and the benchmark universe includes NYSE and AMEX stocks only. Variables are 
defined in Table I. To test the difference in means, we use two-sided T-test and T-statistics are 
reported in brackets. To test the difference in medians, we use two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test 
and the corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively.  
Means of Cumulative DGTW Characteristics-adjusted Returns (LTCAR_DGTW_NA) 
 (Benchmark Universe: NYSE, AMEX) 
Panel A. Sorted by Large-trade Abnormal OFI (ABN_OFILarge, t+2, t+5) 
  Q1 
(Net Sell) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(Net Buy) 
Q5-Q1 [t-stat]  or 
(Wilcoxon 
P-value) 
 Nobs 
 
5313 5316 5316 5315 5316   
1-mon mean -0.0017 -0.0811 -0.0671 -0.118 -0.1242 -0.1225 [-0.76] 
[t+6, 
t+20] 
median -0.1276 -0.1378 -0.0718 -0.1759 -0.1959 -0.0683 (0.5618) 
2-mon mean 0.0975 -0.4883 -0.1143 -0.2062 -0.3904 -0.4879** [-1.97] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
median 0.044 -0.4317 -0.1607 -0.0202 -0.2961 -0.3401* (0.0607) 
4-mon mean 0.4337 -0.4997 -0.0889 -0.2423 -0.5551 -0.988*** [-2.75] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
median 0.1989 -0.4541 -0.198 -0.3424 -1.0212 -1.220*** (0.0008) 
6-mon mean 0.2158 -0.2582 0.0989 -0.2177 -0.7651 -0.9810** [-2.22] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
median -0.2792 -0.3222 0.2043 -0.4416 -1.1409 -0.8617** (0.0133) 
12-mon mean 1.4007 0.7379 0.9703 0.4429 0.5021 -0.8986 [-1.39] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
median -0.0569 -0.525 0.0205 -0.5342 -1.0459 -0.989 (0.0856) 
        
Panel B. Sorted by Medium-trade Abnormal OFI (ABN_OFIMedium, t+2, t+5) 
  Q1 
(Net Sell) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(Net Buy) 
Q5-Q1 [t-stat]  or 
(Wilcoxon 
P-value) 
 Nobs 
 
5313 5316 5316 5316 5315   
1-mon mean -0.3911 -0.1578 -0.0394 -0.0053 0.2014 0.5926*** [3.63] 
[t+6, 
t+20] 
median -0.5294 -0.2576 -0.0545 -0.0015 0.0639 0.5933*** (0.0001) 
2-mon mean -0.6747 -0.3526 -0.2373 -0.2338 0.3966 1.0713*** [4.32] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
median -0.4824 -0.3682 -0.1381 -0.1087 0.2895 0.7719*** (<.0001) 
4-mon mean -0.3081 -0.5569 -0.2763 -0.2733 0.4621 0.7703** [2.14] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
median -0.8367 -0.5534 -0.3248 -0.1109 0.118 0.9547*** (0.0085) 
6-mon mean -0.3268 -0.4635 -0.129 -0.5038 0.4966 0.8234* [1.85] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
median -0.8147 -0.4287 -0.1702 -0.8749 0.3563 1.171** (0.012) 
12-mon mean 1.9452 0.2055 1.0158 -0.5374 1.4253 -0.5199 [-0.79] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
median -0.1252 -0.8804 -0.0952 -1.4376 0.4166 0.5418 (0.7474) 
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Panel C. Sorted by Small-trade Abnormal OFI (ABN_OFISmall, t+2, t+5) 
  Q1 
(Net Sell) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(Net Buy) 
Q5-Q1 [t-stat]  or 
(Wilcoxon 
P-value) 
 Nobs 
 
5313 5311 5321 5316 5315   
1-mon mean -0.3173 -0.0794 -0.0896 -0.0223 0.1164 0.4337*** [2.62] 
[t+6, 
t+20] 
median -0.3692 -0.2106 -0.1148 -0.0312 0.0219 0.3911*** (0.0084) 
2-mon mean -0.7876 -0.3147 -0.2652 0.0052 0.2601 1.0477*** [4.22] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
median -0.5697 -0.4371 -0.1418 0.0511 0.2511 0.8208*** (<.0001) 
4-mon mean -0.5407 -0.3258 -0.3307 -0.2534 0.4979 1.0386*** [2.87] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
median -0.8209 -0.7594 -0.3972 -0.2362 0.4156 1.2365*** 0.0002 
6-mon mean -0.2968 -0.4369 -0.2866 -0.1414 0.2352 0.532 [1.2] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
median -0.8396 -0.7364 -0.6436 0.0248 0.3513 1.1909** 0.0403 
12-mon mean 1.2541 0.7226 0.3971 0.3684 1.3121 0.0579 [0.09] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
median -0.6434 -1.0223 -0.1638 -0.2947 0.1972 0.8406 0.2764 
        
 
2.4.3 Robustness Analysis 
2.4.3.1 Non-overlapping observations only 
 Since analysts’ forecast announcements are frequent events, it is very 
likely that there are overlapping periods when we measure long-run abnormal 
returns after different forecast announcements for the same firm. The 
overlapping returns will lead to time-series dependence, i.e., the long-run returns 
for the same firm at different event dates are highly correlated, and will bias 
toward rejecting the null hypothesis.  Lyon, et al. (1999) argue that it is one of the 
most severe form of dependence in long-run event studies, and suggest that the 
only ready solution to this problem is to eliminate observations with overlapping 
measurement periods. Therefore, in Table 2.7 we repeat our analysis of Table 
2.6 for observations without overlapping return measurement periods. 29  Not 
surprisingly, as we impose this requirement and lengthen the holding periods, the 
                                                 
29
 We keep the earlier sample when two samples have overlapping returns. 
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sample size drops dramatically. As shown in Table 2.7, the pattern previously 
observed still holds for the non-overlapping sample subset. The only noticeable 
difference is that even though the large trades are still unprofitable at any holding 
horizon, the negative relation between trade imbalance of large trades and future 
returns is no longer statistically significant. 
Table 2.7 Robustness Analysis I: 
Post-earnings-forecast Long-term CARs 
Sorted by the Abnormal OFIs during [t+2, t+5] 
For Non-overlapping Observations Only 
 
Here, we require the observations whose long-run CAR measurement periods do not overlap with 
those of other observations. In case of an overlapping, we drop the later observations. The 
reported are means and medians of the long-term cumulative abnormal returns following earnings 
forecast announcements. We sort the forecasts into quintiles, based on the cumulative abnormal 
OFIs of different trade sizes measured during the period immediately after the forecast 
announcement [t+2, t+5]. The long-run CAR is measured using DGTW characteristics-adjusted 
returns and the benchmark universe includes NYSE and AMEX stocks only. Variables are 
defined in Table I. To test the difference in means, we use two-sided T-test and T-statistics are 
reported in brackets. To test the difference in medians, we use two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test 
and the corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
  
Means of Cumulative DGTW Characteristics-adjusted Returns (LTCAR_DGTW_NA) 
 (Benchmark Universe: NYSE, AMEX) 
Panel A. Sorted by Large-trade Abnormal OFI (ABN_OFILarge, t+2, t+5) 
  Q1 
(Net Sell) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(Net Buy) 
Q5-Q1 [t-stat]  or 
(Wilcoxon 
P-value) 
 Nobs 3798 3800 3800 3801 3799   
1-mon mean 0.0103 0.0571 -0.009 -0.085 -0.1266 -0.1369 [-0.72] 
[t+6, 
t+20] 
median -0.1069 -0.0613 -0.0311 -0.1423 -0.1628 -0.0559 (0.5563) 
 Nobs 3075 3077 3075 3078 3074   
2-mon mean 0.1574 -0.4181 0.0415 -0.2213 -0.3756 -0.533 [-1.64] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
median 0.0773 -0.4471 -0.1511 -0.1843 -0.1514 -0.2287 (0.1576) 
 Nobs 2197 2201 2199 2201 2198   
4-mon mean 0.3254 -0.6752 0.5388 0.0285 -0.0112 -0.3365 [-0.6] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
median -0.0899 -0.5332 0.3014 -0.3306 -0.4825 -0.3926 (0.2536) 
 Nobs 1764 1770 1769 1770 1768   
6-mon mean 0.6206 -0.7988 0.7464 -0.083 -0.5385 -1.1591 [-1.5] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
median 0.0613 -0.6895 0.2349 -0.4045 -1.231 -1.2923* (0.0936) 
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Panel B. Sorted by Medium-trade Abnormal OFI (ABN_OFIMedium, t+2, t+5) 
  Q1 
(Net Sell) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(Net Buy) 
Q5-Q1 [t-stat]  or 
(Wilcoxon 
P-value) 
 Nobs 3797 3801 3800 3801 3799   
1-mon mean -0.3689 -0.1256 0.0454 0.0168 0.2788 0.6478*** [3.37] 
[t+6, 
t+20] 
median -0.6074 -0.235 0.0267 0.0135 0.1687 0.7761*** (0.0001) 
 Nobs 3074 3078 3075 3078 3074   
2-mon mean -0.8446 -0.0815 -0.2146 -0.1722 0.4967 1.3413*** [4.18] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
median -0.6239 -0.1914 -0.2009 -0.1401 0.3123 0.9362*** (<.0001) 
 Nobs 2197 2201 2199 2201 2198   
4-mon mean -0.8015 -0.1011 -0.0132 0.3749 0.7457 1.5473*** [2.77] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
median -1.286 -0.2424 0.0225 0.1073 0.5162 1.8022*** (0.002) 
 Nobs 1764 1770 1769 1770 1768   
6-mon mean -0.0146 -0.8808 0.167 -0.2642 0.9384 0.953 [1.25] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
median -1.4322 -1.0577 -0.0431 -0.7898 0.8234 2.2556** (0.0318) 
        
 
Panel C. Sorted by Small-trade Abnormal OFI (ABN_OFISmall, t+2, t+5) 
  Q1 
(Net Sell) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(Net Buy) 
Q5-Q1 [t-stat]  or 
(Wilcoxon 
P-value) 
 Nobs 3797 3802 3799 3801 3799   
1-mon mean -0.3135 0.0074 -0.1096 0.0376 0.2245 0.5380*** [2.76] 
[t+6, 
t+20] 
median -0.3238 -0.1736 -0.0842 0.0016 0.0484 0.3722*** 0.0046 
 Nobs 3074 3079 3074 3079 3073   
2-mon mean -0.7908 -0.1304 -0.2071 0.0978 0.214 1.0048*** [3.13] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
median -0.6111 -0.4144 -0.0617 -0.075 0.1536 0.7647*** 0.0006 
 Nobs 2197 2201 2199 2201 2198   
4-mon mean -0.7321 0.4608 -0.078 0.2434 0.3102 1.0423* [1.87] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
median -1.1485 0.142 -0.0408 -0.1943 0.2277 1.3762** 0.024 
 Nobs 1764 1771 1768 1770 1768   
6-mon mean -0.6714 1.0437 -0.2801 -0.4523 0.3021 0.9735 [1.27] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
median -1.4104 0.3357 -0.1582 -0.939 0.1256 1.536* 0.0615 
        
 
 
2.4.3.2 Conditioning on the Signs of Forecast Revisions  
 This section examines if the prior results hold following both positive and 
negative forecast revisions. Existing studies suggest that the market may react to 
good and bad news differently. For example, Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) show 
that the momentum effect is stronger for past losers and they attribute this 
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phenomenon to the slow diffusion of bad news. In Table 2.8, we repeat the 
analysis separately for stocks experiencing positive revisions and those with 
negative revisions. We find that the predictive power of medium-size trade 
imbalance for future returns holds following both positive and negative revisions, 
although the predictive power extends over a shorter time on the positive side 
(for about two months). However, small-size trade imbalance can predict future 
returns only following negative revisions. So far, we do not have a good 
explanation for this result.  
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Table 2.8 Robustness Analysis II: 
Post-earnings-forecast Long-term CARs 
Sorted by the Signs of Forecast Revisions and Abnormal OFI during [t+2, t+5] 
 
The reported are means and medians of the long-term cumulative abnormal returns following 
earnings forecast announcements. Every year, we first sort the forecasts into two groups, based 
on the signs of forecast revision. Within each revision group, the forecasts are further sorted into 
quintiles based on abnormal OFIs of different trade sizes immediately after forecast 
announcements [t+2, t+5]. The long-run CAR is measured using DGTW characteristics-adjusted 
returns and the benchmark universe includes NYSE and AMEX stocks only. Variables are 
defined in Table I. To test the difference in means, we use two-sided T-test and T-statistics are 
reported in brackets. To test the difference in medians, we use two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test 
and the corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 
Means of Cumulative DGTW Characteristics-adjusted Returns (LTCAR_DGTW_NA) 
 (Benchmark Universe: NYSE, AMEX) 
Panel A. Following Positive Revisions (FCST_REV>0) 
Sorted By 
ABN_OFI t+2, t+5 
 nobs [t+6, 
t+20] 
[t+6, 
t+40] 
[t+6, 
t+80] 
[t+6, 
t+120] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
Large Trades 
 
Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2456 0.724 0.7707 1.1499 1.3536 2.6857 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2456 0.394 0.6355 0.8572 0.7062 2.276 
 Q5-Q1  -0.33 -0.1352 -0.2927 -0.6473 -0.4097 
 [t-stat]  [-1.42] [-0.39] [-0.57] [-1.02] [-0.43] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 
 0.1798 0.7447 0.3201 0.3184 0.4285 
Medium Trades Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2456 0.299 0.312 0.6101 0.7073 2.5741 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2456 0.7263 1.0507 1.1901 1.2161 2.1462 
 Q5-Q1  0.4273* 0.7387** 0.58 0.5087 -0.4279 
 [t-stat]  [1.84] [2.11] [1.13] [0.79] [-0.45] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 
 0.0403 0.1067 0.2381 0.2875 0.7034 
Small Trades Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2456 0.4376 0.5151 0.6502 1.3455 2.6521 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2456 0.4556 0.6383 0.8607 0.4534 1.7654 
 Q5-Q1  0.018 0.1232 0.2106 -0.892 -0.8866 
 [t-stat]  [0.08] [0.35] [0.4] [-1.38] [-0.91] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 0.7133 0.562 0.44 0.5125 0.9291 
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Panel B. Following Negative Revisions (FCST_REV<0) 
Sorted By 
ABN_OFI t+2, t+5 
 nobs [t+6, t+20] [t+6, t+40] [t+6, t+80] [t+6, 
t+120] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
Large Trades 
 
Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2741 -0.6195 -0.6317 -0.1756 -0.55 0.8447 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2744 -0.6119 -1.3659 -1.8883 -2.1293 -1.1109 
 Q5-Q1  0.0076 -0.7342** -1.7126*** -1.5792** -1.9556** 
 [t-stat]  [0.03] [-2.07] [-3.34] [-2.5] [-2.17] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 
 0.8388 0.0312 0.0001 0.0046 0.0284 
Medium Trades Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2741 -0.8866 -1.4578 -1.1166 -1.1149 1.4407 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2744 -0.1677 -0.1068 -0.0698 -0.0091 1.1483 
 Q5-Q1  0.7189*** 1.3510*** 1.0468** 1.1059* -0.2924 
 [t-stat]  [3.1] [3.81] [2.04] [1.76] [-0.32] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 
 0.0007 <.0001 0.0109 0.0196 0.8229 
Small Trades Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2741 -0.9397 -1.8096 -1.3818 -1.4771 -0.0434 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2744 -0.1383 -0.0638 0.2254 0.2679 1.1414 
 Q5-Q1  0.8014*** 1.7458*** 1.6072*** 1.7450*** 1.1848 
 [t-stat]  [3.42] [4.98] [3.14] [2.82] [1.27] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 0.0001 <.0001 0.0001 0.0008 0.0735 
 
2.4.3.3 Regression Analysis 
 In this section, we use the regression framework to control for other 
factors that may potentially influence the long-run post-forecast-announcement 
returns. Specifically, we model the long-run DGTW characteristics-adjusted 
returns (LTCAR_DGTW) of stock i over the post-event period of [t+6, t+T] as:  
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 To avoid the serious time-series dependence issue caused by overlapping 
observations (discussed in Section IV-C-C1), this regression is performed only 
based on observations that do not have overlaps during the measurement period 
 78 
of the long-run CARs. If a certain trade-size group has superior skills in 
interpreting the forecasts, we expect its cumulative order imbalance (ABN_OFI) 
right after the forecasts to be positively related to subsequent long-run stock 
performance (LTCAR_DGTW). As we have shown, in Table VIII, that the 
predictability of small-trade imbalance for future returns depends on the direction 
of forecast revision, we also include the interaction term between the positive 
revision dummy (POS_REV) and small-trade imbalance. Here, the predictive 
power of small-trade imbalance is captured by 3β  following downward revisions 
and ( 43 ββ + ) following positive revisions. To account for the well-known post-
forecast-revision drift effect, we include the signed level of forecast revision 
(FCST_REV). We also include the event-period market response (CAR) to 
control for the part of the announcement surprise that may not be captured by 
forecast revisions. In addition, we include the indicator variable for high-
innovative forecasts, which equals one (highly-innovative good-news forecasts) if 
the forecast is above the prior consensus and analyst’s own prior forecast, zero 
(low-innovative forecasts) if the forecast falls between the prior consensus and 
analyst’s own prior forecast, or negative one (highly-innovative bad-news) if the 
forecast is below the prior consensus and analyst’s own prior forecast. Gleason 
and Lee (2003) show that the post-forecast-revision drifts are stronger following 
highly innovative forecasts. They argue that these forecasts are more accurate 
and less likely to be the product of analysts’ herding, but their importance tends 
to be overlooked by the investors. 
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 Table 2.9 reports the coefficient estimates of Equation (3) estimated using 
Fama-MacBeth regressions. In particular, we perform month-by-month cross-
sectional regressions and report the averages of the monthly estimates. The 
standard errors are adjusted for potential serial correlations using the Newey-
West procedure with three-month lags. Consistent with the univariate sorting 
results, medium-trade imbalance can predict long-run post-event returns for up to 
three months. For small trades, the order imbalance variable is not significant by 
itself, but when we condition its effect on the revision direction, it is clear that 
small-trade imbalance can only predict long-run returns following downward 
revisions as reflected by the positive coefficient for (ABN_OFIsmall, t+2, t+5). 
Moreover, it has little predictive power following upward revisions, since the sum 
of the coefficients of ABN_OFIsmall, t+2, t+5 and its interaction term with positive-
revision dummy ( 43 ββ + ) is close to zero. Similar to the findings of Gleason and 
Lee (2003), stocks associated with high-innovation forecasts experience stronger 
post-event drifts and this effect lasts for up to six months. 
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Table 2.9 
Regression Analysis of Post-earnings-forecast Long-term CARs  
(For Non-overlapping Observations Only) 
 
This table reports the regression results of the post-earnings-forecast long-term CARs on the abnormal OFIs of different trade sizes immediately after forecast 
announcements [t+2, t+5] and other controls. The abnormal return is measured using DGTW characteristics-adjusted approach and the benchmark universe includes NYSE 
and AMEX stocks only. Fama-MacBeth Regressions are month-by-month cross-sectional regressions, and the coefficient estimates are the average of monthly estimates. 
The standard errors of the coefficients are adjusted for the serial correlation using Newey-West procedure with three lags. POS_REV is a dummy variable and equals to one 
if the forecast revision is positive. Other variables are defined in Table I. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 
1%-levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variables: LTCAR_DGTW_NA  
 Fama-Macbeth Regressions 
LTCAR_DGTW  Period: [t+6, t+20] [t+6, t+40] [t+6, t+60] [t+6, t+80] [t+6,t+120] [t+6, t+20] [t+6, t+40] [t+6, t+60] [t+6, t+80] [t+6,t+120] 
Intercept 0.04532 -.05464 0.16748 0.20305 0.26877 0.04912 -.06845 0.14472 0.19024 0.25120 
 (0.51) (-0.31) (0.57) (0.69) (0.62) (0.55) (-0.38) (0.5) (0.64) (0.56) 
ABN_OFILarge, t+2, t+5 -.01509 -.11243 -.03943 -.04553 -.15555 -.01497 -.12117* -.03342 -.04643 -.11661 
 (-0.49) (-1.59) (-0.52) (-0.5) (-1.25) (-0.48) (-1.73) (-0.44) (-0.52) (-1) 
ABN_OFIMed, t+2, t+5 0.09527** 0.14557** 0.21915** 0.06595 0.16392 0.10447** 0.15037** 0.21976** 0.09209 0.20163 
 (1.99) (2.05) (2.1) (0.48) (1.04) (2.16) (2.17) (2.03) (0.68) (1.21) 
ABN_OFIsmall,  t+2, t+5 0.04754 0.09041 0.22436** 0.25655 0.11167 0.09133* 0.25300*** 0.38145** 0.35053* 0.25284 
 (1.3) (1.15) (2.06) (1.62) (0.79) (1.67) (2.75) (2.34) (1.9) (1.38) 
POS_REV* 
ABN_OFIsmall,  t+2, t+5      -.14849** -.37514*** -.33016* -.20605 -.38772 
      (-2.01) (-4.11) (-1.77) (-0.95) (-1.49) 
FCST_REV 1.79545 15.7894 12.8548 -.15086 6.55526 0.66883 12.9075 9.13438 -.86989 9.53901 
 (0.17) (1.24) (0.61) (-0.01) (0.15) (0.06) (0.98) (0.45) (-0.04) (0.21) 
CARt-1, t+1 -.01740 0.01259 -.01861 0.05594 0.04020 -.01902 0.01213 -.02044 0.06248 0.04471 
 (-0.73) (0.31) (-0.34) (0.71) (0.43) (-0.81) (0.3) (-0.38) (0.76) (0.47) 
INNOV_SIG 0.41288*** 0.67385*** 0.99182*** 1.00334*** 1.41940*** 0.42638*** 0.68188*** 1.01575*** 1.00443*** 1.39622*** 
 
(3.84) (3.68) (4.41) (3.41) (3.94) (4.06) (3.77) (4.48) (3.48) (3.65) 
Num of Observations   17841   14429   11983   10281    8264   17841   14429   11983   10281    8264 
Adjusted R-square 1.182% 1.518% 1.913% 2.081% 1.966% 1.415% 1.540% 2.056% 2.178% 2.401% 
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2.5 Using Alternative Trade-size Cutoff Points 
 So far, all our empirical results are based on a trade-size classification 
scheme that uses the same cutoff points for all the trades and is purely based on 
the dollar value of the trades. Prior studies have raised concerns over this 
approach. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) show that both institutional and retail 
traders scale down their trade sizes when trading in smaller firms. Hence, 
informed traders may also reduce their trades for smaller firms in order to 
effectively “hide” their trades. Consequently, the static classification scheme 
could induce systematic measurement errors that are correlated with firm size. 
For example, many medium trades (trades with dollar value between $5,000 and 
$50,000) for small firms may actually be considered as large trades by informed 
traders, and thus could be avoided when informed traders are aiming at 
exploiting their private information. In addition, Lee (1992) notes that although a 
dollar-based size proxy is conceptually superior to a share-based size proxy, the 
dollar-based proxy is sensitive to small price changes, due to the “round-lot” 
recording mechanism used by the TAQ database30.  
 To address the above two concerns and check the sensitivity of our 
results to an alternative trade-size classification method, we rerun the analysis 
using a firm-size- and stock-price-specific trade-size classification method that is 
                                                 
30
 In particular, TAQ data only report the number of shares traded in hundreds. For instance, if the 
cutoff point for small and medium trades is $10,000 and the current stock price is $25, then all the 
trades with size of 100-400 shares are classified as small trades. However, even if the stock price 
increases just by $0.01, only trades with size of 100-300 shares would be classified as small 
trades. 
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similar to the method used by Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) and Hvidkjaer 
(2006). The details of the method are described as follows: 
(1) In each month t, we sort all firms into size quintiles based on their market 
capitalization at the end of the previous month. 
(2) Within each size quintile, we identify the 25th and 75th percentiles of dollar 
trade size for month t, and use them as the dollar-based cutoff points for all 
the firms in this size quintile31. 
(3) We compare the month t opening price (first-trade price) for stock i to the 
dollar-based cut-off points calculated in Step (2) and determine the smallest 
(largest) number of round-lot shares that is greater (smaller) than or equal to 
the 75th percentile (25th percentile) of the dollar trade size. This number of 
round-lot shares will be the share-based trade-size cutoff point for stock i in 
month t. For example, trades with number of shares greater than or equal to 
the share-based 75th percentile cutoff point are defined as large trades. 
The main results based on the above classification method are reported in 
Table 2.10. As we can see, the results are very similar to the prior results. 
Specifically, the medium-trades group is still the only group that is trading in the 
same direction as upcoming forecast revisions. The medium-trade imbalance 
immediately after the forecast announcements can predict future long-run stock 
performances, following both positive and negative forecast revisions. Small-
                                                 
31
 This step is different from the approach used by Lee and Radhakrishna (2000), who suggest to 
use $100/$200 multiplied by 99
th
 percentile of the stock price within each size quintile as the 
cutoff points. They argue that this approach maximizes the institution trades in the large trade-
size group. Nonetheless, our purpose is simply to identify if a trade is large or small, relative to all 
the other trades within the same size quintile. Therefore, we believe this approach is more 
appropriate. 
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trade imbalance also possesses predictive power for future long-run stock 
performance, but only following the negative forecast revisions.  
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Table 2.10 
Results using Alternative Trade-size Classification Method 
 
In Panel A, the reported are means of the cumulative abnormal OFI of different trade-size groups 
across various news groups. We sort the forecasts into five news groups, based on the market 
response during the announcement date. In particular, the forecast is “very-positive” news, if 
CARt-1, t+1 >= 5%; the forecast is “positive” news, if 1%<= CARt-1, t+1 < 5%; the forecast is ”neutral” 
news, if -1% <= CARt-1, t+1 < 1%; the forecast is “negative” news, if -5% <= CARt-1, t+1 < -1%; the 
forecast is “very-negative” news, if CARt-1, t+1 <= -5%. In Panel B, the reported are means of the 
long-term CARs following earnings forecast announcements. Every year, we first sort the 
forecasts into two groups, based on the signs of forecast revision. Within each revision group, the 
forecasts are further sorted into quintiles based on abnormal OFIs of different trade sizes 
immediately after forecast announcements [t+2, t+5]. The long-run CAR is measured using 
DGTW characteristics-adjusted returns and the benchmark universe includes NYSE and AMEX 
stocks only. To test the difference in means, we use two-sided T-test and T-statistics are reported 
in brackets. To test the difference in medians, we use two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test and the 
corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%-, 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Pre-event Period (t-5, t-2) and the Nature of Upcoming Forecast Revisions 
   News Nature  
   Very 
Negative 
Negative Neutral Positive Very 
Positive 
VP-VN 
[t-stat]  
 nobs 2191 8551 7847 7131 2221  
Large Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean 0.0207 0.0602 0.0317 0.0183 0.0284 0.0077 
[0.13] 
Medium Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean -0.056 -0.0197 -0.0203 0.0095 0.0498 0.1057** 
[2.03] 
Small Trades 
ABN_OFI 
mean -0.0196 -0.0269 -0.0294 -0.0034 0.0753 0.0949 
[1.54] 
 
Panel B. Post-event Trading and Long-run Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
B-1. Following Positive Revisions (FCST_REV>0) 
Sorted By 
ABN_OFI t+2, t+5 
 nobs [t+6, t+20] [t+6, t+40] [t+6, t+80] [t+6, 
t+120] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
Large Trades 
 
Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2461 0.8525 0.9393 1.0466 1.0099 2.3382 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2467 0.6924 0.7489 1.2862 1.5214 2.9835 
 Q5-Q1  -0.1601 -0.1904 0.2395 0.5115 0.6453 
 [t-stat]  [-0.68] [-0.53] [0.46] [0.79] [0.65] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 0.383 0.6881 0.6491 0.4711 0.8568 
Medium Trades Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2468 0.2337 0.3276 0.5571 1.1367 3.4348 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2452 0.9443 1.0939 1.814 1.884 2.3806 
 Q5-Q1  0.7106*** 0.7663** 1.2569** 0.7474 -1.0543 
 [t-stat]  [2.99] [2.12] [2.37] [1.13] [-1.07] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 0.003 0.0345 0.014 0.1007 0.6796 
Small Trades Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2471 0.3187 0.606 0.6949 1.6451 3.445 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2471 0.6528 0.9663 1.0599 0.6493 2.3208 
 Q5-Q1  0.3341 0.3603 0.365 -0.9958 -1.1242 
 [t-stat]  [1.37] [0.97] [0.67] [-1.49] [-1.12] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 0.362 0.5664 0.4543 0.3825 0.5295 
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B-2. Following Negative Revisions (FCST_REV<0) 
Sorted By 
ABN_OFI t+2, t+5 
 nobs [t+6, t+20] [t+6, t+40] [t+6, t+80] [t+6, 
t+120] 
[t+6, 
t+250] 
Large Trades 
 
Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2749 -0.5429 -0.7364 -0.2045 -0.3455 2.0714 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2758 -0.6267 -1.1753 -1.367 -1.638 -1.5371 
 Q5-Q1  -0.0838 -0.4389 -1.1626** -1.2925** -3.6085*** 
 [t-stat]  [-0.36] [-1.22] [-2.23] [-2.03] [-3.88] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 
 0.74 0.1951 0.0065 0.0078 0.0004 
Medium Trades Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2745 -1.0927 -1.5342 -1.0907 -1.3485 0.4875 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2753 -0.4247 -0.1188 0.1485 0.2355 0.9647 
 Q5-Q1  0.6679*** 1.4154*** 1.2392** 1.5840** 0.4772 
 [t-stat]  [2.82] [3.95] [2.41] [2.51] [0.51] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 
 0.0002 <.0001 0.0022 0.0015 0.4347 
Small Trades Q1 
(Net Sell) 
2726 -0.954 -1.8715 -1.4119 -1.2762 0.8981 
 Q5 
(Net buy) 
2763 -0.2846 -0.2304 0.2758 0.0959 1.5672 
 Q5-Q1  0.6694*** 1.6411*** 1.6877*** 1.3722** 0.6691 
 [t-stat]  [2.75] [4.47] [3.18] [2.11] [0.7] 
 (Wilcoxon 
p-value) 
 0.0006 <.0001 0.0001 0.0059 0.2798 
 
2.6 Conclusions  
 This paper examines the order flow imbalance of different trade-size 
groups surrounding analysts’ forecast announcements. We find evidence 
suggesting that certain traders are informed about either the forthcoming 
analysts’ forecasts or long-term value of the stock, and informed traders prefer to 
use medium-size trades to exploit their private information advantage. 
Specifically, medium-size trade imbalance prior to the forecast announcements is 
positively correlated with the nature of forecast revisions, while in the days 
immediately after the forecasts medium-size trade imbalance is positively 
correlated with future stock returns for up to four months. Small-size trade 
imbalance is also positively correlated with future returns but only following 
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downward revisions. In contrast, it is also shown that large trades placed right 
after the forecasts are unprofitable and generate slightly negative profits in the 
long run. Overall, our results are consistent with the “stealth trading hypothesis” 
proposed by Barclay and Warner (1993). 
 One puzzling finding of this paper is that the predictability of small trades 
for long-run stock returns only exists during the periods following downward 
revisions. Further studies may explore potential explanations for this 
phenomenon. Subject to the data availability, another interesting line of research 
is to explore which type of medium-size traders, institutions or individuals, are 
more likely to be informed before the analysts’ forecast announcements. If the 
informed are institutions, do they tend to have an existing business relationship 
with the analysts’ brokerage house? 
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